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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The principle of democratic governance is a defining feature of co-operative 
organizations.  Members of the board of directors are the elected representatives of the 
membership, and as democratic organizations, there is an expectation that co-operatives 
should have adequate representation of member groups on their boards.  However, 
empirical evidence indicates that many Canadian co-operative boards embody a 
“diversity problem”: there is little diversity in board representational characteristics.  
The main objective of this study is to identify key barriers and facilitators of 
representational diversity in co-operative leadership structures.  To this end, two core 
research questions are posed.  First, how do boards achieve diversity?  Second, how do 
diverse boards maintain their diversity?  Board diversity is defined as at least 30 per cent 
female representation on the board.  Factors in four key areas believed to affect board 
diversity levels are identified: problem recognition; formal diversity policies; proactive 
recruitment strategies; and responsive governance.  For each area, two specific 
theoretical propositions are posited and examined. 
Two credit union boards of directors are selected as case studies.  The first case 
is the Surrey Metro Savings Board of Directors between 1995 and 2002, which was 
homogenous in terms of its demographic composition.  The second case is the Coast 
Capital Savings Board of Directors between 2001 and 2006, which was diverse in terms 
of its demographic composition.  In view of the theoretical propositions that fall under 
the four main areas of inquiry, each case is examined separately, after which a cross-
case analysis is conducted.   
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The case study findings support the view that, to achieve diversity, boards must 
recognize representational homogeneity as problematic, make diversity a priority issue, 
and take deliberate action towards increasing their diversity levels.  These findings also 
support the view that, to maintain their diversity, diverse boards must have an inclusive 
governance approach and provide all board members with meaningful opportunities to 
participate in decision making processes.  This study contributes to a greater 
understanding of how co-operative organizations can rectify the under representation of 
key groups within their own organizations and communities, and empower those who 
typically sit on the margins of economic, social and political power.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
Organizational governance as a research topic has received considerable 
attention, particularly since the corporate scandals of the 1990s.  Although relatively 
new, the study of board diversity is one area of governance that is an emerging literature.  
There have been significant gains in the participation of women and minorities in the 
workforce and management in the last two decades.  However, there is an obvious gap 
between the participation of women and minorities in employment and management 
ranks, and those holding leadership positions in the corporate, non-profit, and co-
operative business sectors.  The under representation of minority groups, particularly 
within senior leadership positions, is often referred to as the “diversity problem.”1 
 Statistical evidence concerning board composition of co-operative organizations 
reveals that many co-operative leadership structures embody a diversity problem.  In 
September of 2004, the Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA) and Brown 
Governance released their findings from the first national survey on credit union 
governance practices.2  In the area of board composition, they found that over 30 per 
cent of co-operatives (including credit unions) and 28 per cent of credit unions have no 
women on their board of directors.  In an earlier survey, CCA found that among the co-
operatives surveyed almost 60 per cent of agricultural co-operatives had no women on 
their board and 85 per cent had no visible minorities, while 95 per cent of urban co-
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operatives had no visible minorities.3  In effect, it is reasonable to assume many co-
operative organizations lack demographic diversity in their governance structures. 
 The main objective of this research project is to create a better understanding of 
the barriers and facilitators of representational diversity with respect to co-operative 
boards of directors.  Specifically, the focus of this study is the representation, or lack 
thereof, of women and visible minorities in co-operative leadership structures.  The lack 
of demographic diversity on co-operative boards demonstrates that there exists a gap 
between the theoretical expectations of co-operative democracy and the reality within 
co-operative organizations.  This gap is problematic for several reasons.  First, the lack 
of participation by women and visible minorities suggests that co-operatives are missing 
important views, opinions and social perspectives in their decision making bodies, and 
may not be meeting the needs of their members.  It is assumed that women and visible 
minorities bring unique perspectives to the decision making process.  Because we live in 
gender and culturally structured societies, one’s life experiences are significantly 
influenced by what sex or ethnicity they are.  Such experiences shape one’s perspectives, 
the starting point for determining one’s values, beliefs, views and opinions.  The call for 
diversity on co-operative boards stems from the need to disperse political power among 
various social groups, and to ensure that the needs of all members are considered in the 
decision making process. 
Second, the principles and values that co-operatives espouse require them to be 
fair, equitable, and inclusive.  Co-operatives claim to be inclusive organizations 
concerning their membership as well as their leadership structures and, therefore, should 
reflect this claim in practice.  Finally, the idea that co-operatives are equitable and 
inclusive organizations is also a part of the democratic structure of co-operatives.  As 
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such, co-operatives have governance concerns that extend beyond the need for 
transparency and ethical accounting practices.  The democratic element of co-operatives 
requires them not only to worry about transparency and accountability, but also how 
they “do democracy.”  There is an expectation that, as democratic organizations 
embodying the principles of equality and equity, co-operatives should have adequate 
membership representation on their board of directors.  Although the principle of “one 
member, one vote” is central to the practice of co-operative democracy, it is only one 
part of the democratic process.  In addition to formal elections, the principle of 
democratic governance requires that all members have adequate opportunities to 
participate in, and be represented on, key decision making bodies, regardless of their 
social background.  
This research project is divided in six main chapters.  In Chapter Two, pertinent 
literature from the fields of political science, co-operative studies, and board diversity 
are reviewed, and then a broad theoretical framework for this study is developed.  Two 
broad categories of democracy are discussed: representational and participatory.  Some 
feminist analyses of democracy are also surveyed.  These works provide a critical view 
of traditional theories of democracy and highlight the gender biases that exist within 
such theories.  As well, the concept of representation is considered.  This section looks 
at the various components of the concept of representation and describes the merits of 
descriptive, or mirror, representation.  Mills’ theory of elite capture of democratic 
institutions is also reviewed.   
Next, the literature on co-operative democracy and board diversity is reviewed.  
Surprisingly, there are few in-depth treatments of co-operative democracy, despite the 
fact that democratic governance is a defining feature of co-operative organizations.  
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Recent studies on the topic of board diversity represent current attempts to further 
develop the notion of co-operative democracy and to put democratic principles into 
practice.  In the last section, this study’s broad theoretical framework is presented.  
Perspectives from the field of political science are applied to the co-operative context, 
and are used to develop a theory of co-operative democracy, member participation, and 
representational diversity. 
In Chapter Three, the core research questions, theoretical propositions, and 
methodological approach of this study are presented.  Two core research questions are 
offered.  First, how do boards achieve diversity?  Second, how do diverse boards 
maintain their diversity?  Studies of the representation of women in political institutions 
and co-operative organizations are drawn upon to identify four main areas of inquiry: 
problem recognition, formal diversity policies, proactive recruitment strategies, and 
responsive governance.  Under each area, two specific theoretical propositions are 
posited.  This study aims to identify and compare key characteristics of homogenous and 
diverse boards of directors.  It is argued that to achieve and maintain diversity, boards 
must recognize board homogeneity as problematic, employ a formal diversity policy, 
proactively recruit minority group members to the board, and display responsive 
governance practices. 
This research project adopts a case study approach, whereby two cases are 
selected from a cohort of credit unions that were located in the Greater Vancouver Area 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The first case study is the Surrey Metro Savings 
(SMS) Credit Union Board of Directors between 1995 and 2002.  During this time, the 
SMS Board was homogenous in terms of its leadership’s representational characteristics.  
The second case study is the Coast Capital Savings (CCS) Credit Union Board of 
 4
Directors between 2001 and 2006.  Because CCS underwent a significant merger in June 
of 2002, it is examined in two phases: the pre-merger phase and the post-merger phase.  
This board was diverse in terms of its leadership’s representational characteristics.  For 
this study, board diversity is defined as at least 30 percent representation of women and 
visible minorities on the board.  
In chapters four, five and six the findings of the case studies are presented.  The 
findings of each case are based upon a variety of case study data sources, including 
personal interviews, archival information, and organizational documents such as annual 
reports and member newsletters.  The findings of the SMS case study are presented in 
Chapter Four, while the findings of the CCS case study are presented in Chapter Five.  
For each case, the history and structure of the credit union and its board is described, 
after which the theoretical propositions of this study are discussed.  In Chapter Five, a 
cross-case analysis is conducted and the SMS and CCS cases are compared and 
contrasted.  In addition, alternative explanations for the different levels of 
representational diversity in the two studies are explored. 
In the final chapter, the overall objectives and approach of this research project 
are summarized and key findings are highlighted.  The significance and implications of 
these findings are also discussed. 
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1 The lack of diversity on co-operative boards could also be referred to as the “homogeneity problem;” 
however, to be consistent with the existing literature on board diversity, the term “diversity problem” is 
used for the remainder of this thesis. 
2 CCA and Brown Governance, Measuring Up: National Report on Credit Union Governance Practices 
(Ottawa: Canadian Co-operative Association, 2004); CCA and Brown Governance, Towards Excellence: 
National Report on Credit Unions and Co-operative Governance Practices (Ottawa: Canadian Co-
operative Association and Brown Governance, 2004). 
3 CCA, “Unity Through Diversity,” Governance Matters (Winter 2003); available from 
http://www.coopscanada.coop/NewsLetter/Governance/ winter2003/; accessed 24 August 2005. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a large body of literature concerning theories of democracy from which to 
develop a theoretical framework for this study.  In this chapter, the research project is 
situated within the relevant fields of study through reviewing the pertinent literature on 
democratic theory, co-operative democracy, and board diversity.  This literature review 
helps the researcher draw upon, and bring together, important perspectives from the field 
of political science toward applying them to the co-operative context.   
This chapter has four sections.  The first section is an overview of several theories 
of democracy in the broad categories of representative and participatory democracy.  
This helps distinguish the basic assumptions of each model.  In the second section, the 
extant literature on co-operative democracy is discussed.  In this body of literature, there 
is a strong emphasis on member participation.  The third section surveys the literature on 
board diversity and co-operatives.  Authors of board diversity and co-operatives suggest 
that the diversity problem in co-operative organizations has implications for the 
economic and democratic success of co-operatives.  The final section of this chapter 
describes the theoretical framework of this study, which is developed by drawing upon 
several theories discussed in the previous sections.  The purpose of co-operative 
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democracy, the institutional arrangements for effective co-operative democracy, and the 
argument for board diversity are presented in this section. 
 
2.2 Democratic Theory 
 
For centuries, political theorists have developed and revised theories of democracy.  
Most theories of democracy include notions of equality, freedom, political participation, 
and legitimacy.  However, these notions are often defined and interpreted differently.  
As a result, theorists come to different conclusions about the merits of democracy itself 
and the possibility of achieving democracy as a way for people to organize and govern 
themselves.   
This section reviews two broad categories of democratic thought: participatory 
democracy and representative democracy.  Although there are many variations within 
each category, a discussion of the fundamental differences between participatory and 
representative democracy highlights the different assumptions marking each school of 
thought.  This section also reviews the contributions of feminist theories, theories of 
representation, and elite theories to democratic thought.  The feminist theorists presented 
in this section challenge some key assumptions of both representative and participatory 
democracy and offer alternative ways of conceptualizing political equality.  A discussion 
of some theories of representation provides an overview of the different ways to 
conceptualize the act of representation and how, if at all, the act of representation relates 
to the notions of political equality and participation.  Elite theories examine why the 
achievement of democratic ideals have often failed. 
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2.2.1 Representative Democracy 
 
The works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke have been influential in modern 
political thought, particularly concerning representative democracy.  The authors 
develop the notion of equality as one where all men are equal in a “state of nature” and 
therefore each must be given the same right to choose their representatives.  Citizens 
confer legitimacy upon the representatives by consenting to the democratic process, 
which ultimately is created to protect citizens’ interests.  In The Leviathan, Hobbes 
argues that men are self-interested by nature.  According to Hobbes, without a central 
power ruling them, men live in a state of war in which life is certain to be “solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”1  Individuals, therefore, must choose a Leviathan (or an 
assembly of men) to ensure their security.2  In The Second Treatise of Government, 
Locke argues that men are by nature reasonable and rational and choose representatives 
to ensure the protection of their liberty and property.3  Both theorists hold that in the 
case that their representatives do not fulfill their obligation to act in the interests of the 
citizens, citizens hold the power and the right to remove and replace their 
representatives.  In their view, democracy serves as a means for equal citizens to choose 
representatives, as well as a means to secure their interests and protect against tyranny.  
Democracy is useful only to the extent that it serves these purposes.  In this view, there 
is nothing intrinsically good about democracy itself.  
Some recent theories on representative democracy reflect similar notions of 
representation seen in Hobbes and Locke, particularly the protective function of 
democracy.  For example, in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Joseph 
Schumpeter argues that democracy can only be justified as a decision making tool: 
“Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional 
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arrangement for arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions and 
hence incapable of being an end in itself.”4  In his view, citizens have equal political 
rights, particularly the equal opportunity to vote.  However, the masses are viewed as 
incapable of understanding complex political issues.5  The inability to relate to political 
issues which are far removed from one’s everyday reality, according to Schumpeter, 
“accounts not only for a reduced sense of responsibility but also for the absence of 
effective volition.”6  He concludes that democracy is best conceived as a method of 
decision making whereby interested and knowledgeable candidates compete with one 
another for votes and the winners subsequently make decisions on behalf of the broad 
electorate.7 
Robert Dahl presents one of the most recent and significant treatments of 
representative liberal democracy in his book, On Democracy.8  The author contends that 
every person must be considered equal because no one person is definitively better 
qualified to govern than any other.  Citizens are entitled to the same rights and freedoms 
that provide everyone with the same opportunity to participate in political life.9  
Democracy, then, can be justified as the best means to resolve conflicts between 
relatively equal, competing groups within society, to protect citizens against 
authoritarian rule, and to ensure the preservation of individual rights and freedoms.10  In 
his discussion of representative versus participatory democracy, Dahl argues that 
representative democracy resolves problems associated with large-scale, complex 
societies.  Moreover, he contends that one must not assume that people want to 
participate.  For example, Dahl argues that a citizen may not wish to speak because the 
topic of discussion has already been adequately addressed.11  Therefore, representative 
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democracy is desirable because it is practical as an institutional arrangement, and also 
because citizens may prefer it. 
Hobbes and Locke developed theories of representative government that 
influenced modern political thought.  Many democratic institutions in countries such as 
Great Britain, the United States, and Canada were built upon some of the theoretical 
foundations seen in the works of Hobbes and Locke.  Schumpeter was among the first to 
consider how the large-scale, industrial societies of the early 20th century affected the 
practice of democracy and what, in his mind, was a realistic approach for reaching 
democratic ideals.  Dahl’s pluralist theory is an important concept in the context of a 
socially and ethnically diverse society such as Canada.  Although the above authors have 
contributed much to democratic thought, representative democratic theory is but one 
category of democratic theory.  Many models of participatory democracy also draw from 
a rich theoretical background and offer an alternative way to conceive of the notion of 
democracy. 
 
2.2.2 Participatory Democracy 
 
Theories of participatory democracy begin from different premises than 
representative democracy.  For example, in his well-known work, Utilitarianism, 
Liberty, and Representative Government, John Stuart Mill argues that direct democracy 
is the ideal form of government: “There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best 
form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in 
the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only 
having a voice in the exercise of the ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least 
occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government, by the personal 
 11
discharge of some public function, local or general.”12  In this view, political 
participation is a key element of democracy.  Mill contends that democracy is more than 
simply an instrumental process that protects individuals from tyranny.  Democracy is 
intrinsically good in that it promotes the development of virtue and intelligence in 
individual citizens.13  Democratic participation allows citizens to realize their interests, 
to understand the interests of others, to co-operate with one another, and to ensure 
effective control over one’s life. 
Some theorists extend the notion of political participation to include participation 
in organizations such as voluntary or community organizations.  For example, in his 
work, Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville argues that participation in 
voluntary and community organizations helps citizens develop the necessary skills and 
virtues required to serve in formal politics.14  Since de Tocqueville, there have been 
many studies that examine the relationship between citizen participation in community 
organizations and formal politics, some of which come from the literature on co-
operative organizations.  For instance, in the 1998 study entitled The Social and 
Economic Importance of the Co-operative Sector in Saskatchewan, researchers found 
that “co-operatives make a significant contribution to the development of leadership in 
the province of Saskatchewan” and that “involvement on co-operative boards helps to 
prepare individuals for more general community leadership.”15  These works highlight 
the important relationship between participation in community and voluntary 
associations and broader political participation in civic, regional and national democratic 
institutions. 
Mill’s and de Tocqueville’s idea that participation is an essential component of 
good democratic governance is further developed by Carole Pateman.  Building upon 
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Mill’s work, Pateman offers a contemporary perspective of participatory democratic 
theory in her book, Participation and Democratic Theory.16  Pateman’s theory of 
participatory democracy brings democratic participation into the everyday lives of 
citizens.  She argues that participatory democracy is intrinsically valuable.  Citizens, 
according to Pateman, learn about democratic procedures and broaden their perspectives 
and ideas in a participatory society.  She rejects the claim that people are inherently 
apathetic and contends that theorists must look closely at the correlation between apathy, 
low feelings of political efficacy, and low socio-economic status.17  Pateman argues that 
meaningful participation requires individuals to have equal political power and 
participate in the decision making process of everyday activities in areas such as 
industry, family, and higher educational institutions.18  In order to achieve meaningful 
participation, the conceptual dichotomy between private and political life must be 
carefully examined.  Pateman argues that industry is a part of political life and not a 
matter of private life.  To consider industry as part of one’s private life ignores the fact 
that one’s workplace greatly affects their life.  Pateman concludes that participation in 
the workplace is essential for individual empowerment and important for citizens to 
control and develop the environment in which they live.19  
Benjamin Barber makes an important contribution to the literature on participatory 
democracy with his theory of “strong democracy.”  In his book, Strong Democracy: 
Participatory Politics for a New Age, Barber defines strong democracy as a model of 
participatory democracy that “resolves conflict in the absence of an independent ground 
through a participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the creation of 
a political community capable of transforming dependent individuals into free citizens 
and partial and private interests into public goods.”20  Of importance for this study is 
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Barber’s view that politics need not be conceived as a zero-sum game.  Rather, Barber 
argues, democratic participation and deliberation provide the means by which conflict is 
transformed into compromise and co-operation and, as a result, political outcomes are 
accepted by most citizens.21  In his view, people learn from one another and the result of 
participation and discussion is a combination of perspectives. 
Participatory and representative theories of democracy are often compared and 
contrasted.  In practice, representative and participatory institutions exist side by side, 
although more emphasis is usually placed upon the former.  The foundations of 
representative and participatory theories developed before the women’s suffrage 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the achievement of universal 
suffrage, and the sexual revolution of the 1960s.  The development of feminist thought 
in the 20th century challenged established notions of democracy and, in many ways, 
altered the ways in which both representative and participatory theories of democracy 
are understood today.   
 
2.2.3 Democracy and Feminism 
 
Feminist theories have contributed much to democratic thought and have 
challenged several important assumptions underlying liberal representative government 
and participatory theories of democracy.  Liberal democracy is often considered a 
specific type of representative democracy and most often seen in Western political 
systems.22  Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’ Leary characterize liberal democracy as “a 
system of representative government by majority rule in which some individual rights 
are nonetheless protected from interference by the state and cannot be restricted even by 
an electoral majority.” 23  Central to feminist discussions is the public-private distinction 
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identified by some liberal theorists.  For example, Susan Moller Okin argues in her 
work, “Gender, the Public, and the Private,” that liberal democratic theory is inherently 
patriarchal.24  Okin argues that early developments of liberal democratic thought ignored 
women as citizens and, as a result, the public-private dichotomy is based on gendered 
notions.  The family and women’s activities were considered private matters.25  
Therefore, only men were entitled to individual rights and freedoms which ultimately 
provided men with the ability to control there children and wives without interference 
from the state.  She claims that the inclusion of women in the old conception of the 
individual creates a sense of “false gender neutrality.”26  She states that “gender neutral 
terms, if used without real awareness of gender frequently obscure the fact that so much 
of the real experience of ‘persons,’ so long as they live in gendered-structured societies, 
does in fact depend on what sex they are.”27  Inequalities between men and women in 
the private sphere restrict the ability for women to participate in the public sphere.  
Therefore, Okin argues, the distinction between private and public spheres in liberal 
democratic theory is illusory and also helps to perpetuates gender inequality within 
democratic societies.28 
Many feminist critiques are directed toward liberal democracy in particular.  
Carole Pateman, however, offers a feminist critique of mainstream liberal and 
participatory democratic theories.  In a chapter titled “Feminism and Democracy” in her 
book The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory, Pateman 
echoes Okin’s argument and rejects the liberal claim that universal suffrage and formal 
political equality has provided women with equal status as citizens.29  She also argues 
that proponents of participatory democracy have focused on the implications of the 
workplace and its relationship with the private realm without considering the 
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implications of gender and its relationship to the domestic realm and the workplace.30  
Although more women work today than have in the past, the domestic division of labour 
continues to affect the ability of women to participate as equal citizens in the political 
community.  Until sexual harassment, discrimination, and segregation of occupational 
categories along gender lines are eradicated, women will continue to be disadvantaged in 
political life.31  She concludes that “neither the equal opportunity of liberalism nor the 
active, participatory citizenship of all people can be achieved without radical changes in 
personal and domestic life.”32 
The purpose that democracy serves will inevitably shape the kind of democracy 
one sees as appropriate for a nation, a township, or an organization.  The representative 
and participatory theories of democracy are different in that they supply a protective 
purpose and developmental purpose respectively.  Although feminist theorists tend to 
favour participatory democracy, many have not disregarded the need for representation 
in large scale, complex political entities.33  Some participatory democratic theorists 
recognize the practical difficulties associated with modern societies and also accept the 
need for representatives.34  The notion of representation is defined and conceived in 
many different ways.  Important notions to consider in the conceptualization of 
representation include the function of representation, the actions of representatives, and 
the impact of the composition of representative assemblies. 
 
2.2.4 The Concept of Representation 
 
A clear understanding of the concept of representation is of central importance to 
this study.  The claim that diverse representation on co-operative boards of directors is a 
component of good democratic governance suggests that the social backgrounds of 
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representatives is related to their ability to represent their constituents.  However, the 
literature on representation indicates that this relationship is not necessarily 
straightforward.  There are many ways to conceive the act of representation, each of 
which contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the concept.  In order to develop 
a clear understanding of the relationship between a representative’s social background 
and its effect on their ability to represent well, a thorough examination of the concept of 
representation is required.  Each theory of representation discussed in this section 
contributes to the concept of representation used in the theoretical framework of this 
study. 
In her classic work, The Concept of Representation, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin 
successfully demonstrates the complexity of the concept of representation.  She argues 
that most discussions about representation only consider a part of what it means to 
represent a person or a group of people.  Below is a discussion of four ways to think 
about the concept of representation as presented by Pitkin.  First, Pitkin identifies the 
formalistic view, a view that describes the formal relationship between the 
representative and the represented.35  She discusses two types of formalistic views.  The 
authorization view is that in which “a representative is someone who has been 
authorized to act.”36  According to Pitkin, the authorization view is problematic because 
it ignores the representative’s obligation to conform to external standards of behaviour, 
such as constituent expectations.37  The second formalistic view, labeled the 
accountability view, Pitkin describes as a view in which “a representative is someone 
who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does.”38  
The accountability view, Pitkin believes, is attempting to communicate the idea that 
representatives consider the represented, and their actions are constrained by such 
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considerations.39  According to Pitkin, both the authorization and the accountability 
views are partially correct.  In the end, however, she rejects both claims as sufficient as 
definitions of representation: “Neither can tell us anything about what goes on during 
representation, how a representative ought to act or what he is expected to do, how to 
tell whether he has represented well or badly.”40  The formalistic view is, therefore, only 
part of the concept of representation. 
The second view of representation Pitkin discusses is the descriptive view.41  This 
approach consists of “the view that a representative body is distinguished by an accurate 
correspondence or resemblance to what it represents, by reflecting without distortion.”42  
Representatives are expected to provide information about their constituents to the 
assembly.43  According to Pitkin, this indicates nothing about the ability of the 
representative to govern.44  One can be held accountable for what they do, but not for 
what they are.45  She concludes that “if we are interested about information about the 
public, the ideal or perfect reflection or resemblance does no harm, but if our concern is 
political action by our representatives, the idea of accuracy is likely to mislead.”46  
Pitkin accepts that descriptive representation is a means to provide important 
information about constituents to the decision making assembly.  Nevertheless, she 
believes it to be only part of an accurate definition of representation. 
Pitkin is interested in the activity of representing as a substantive activity.47  She 
argues that representation as a substantive activity lies somewhere in between the view 
that a representative is a free agent and the view that a representative is a delegate.48  
This concept is useful at the theoretical level because it enables us to determine good 
from bad representation.  However, this view also captures only part of the concept of 
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representation.  It does not tell us anything about the formalities of representation or the 
institutions that are needed to bring the idea of representation into practice.49   
Finally, Pitkin defines representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in 
a manner responsive to them.”50  According to Pitkin, the concept of representation 
should not be over-simplified in order to define it: the representative “is neither agent 
nor trustee nor deputy nor commissioner; he acts for a group of people without a single 
interest, most of whom seem incapable of forming an explicit will on political 
questions.”51  She concludes that representation should be seen in the context of an 
institutional framework.52  Seen in this context, the partial conceptions of representation 
discussed above can be included.  She states that “representative government is not 
defined by particular actions at a particular moment, but by long-term systematic 
arrangements – by institutions and the way in which they function.”53  As a result, 
according to Pitkin, representative institutions need to be continuously examined in 
order to determine if they are able to realize the ideals of political representation.54 
Pitkin’s view that the concept of representation has various components, each of 
which is more or less important at different times throughout the democratic process, is 
compelling.  Anne Phillips and Iris Young, however, offer alternative views on the 
merits of descriptive representation and its relationship to governance.  Writing from a 
feminist perspective, Anne Phillips discusses at length three arguments made in favour 
of equal gender representation in her article “Democracy and Representation: Or, Why 
Should it Matter Who our Representative Are?”55  Phillips makes an argument for 
gender parity (roughly equal representation) in democratic assemblies, as opposed to an 
argument for more, but not necessarily equal, women’s representation.  First, she 
reviews arguments that are founded on principles of justice.  She begins with the 
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argument that the current division of labour among men and women in society is 
unnatural and is a source of overt discrimination which prevents women from being 
politically active.56  She highlights the claim that women have an equal right to a 
political career.57  Phillips also discusses the argument that gender under representation 
is a function of unequal participation in political parties and “thus treats the equal right 
to be an elected representative as part of an equal right to political participation.”58  She 
concludes that, although the third argument for gender parity is convincing, equal 
participation and equal representation are not necessarily synonymous concepts.  
Representation is often said to remove the requirement of participation, thereby reducing 
the opportunity for those who have a strong interest in politics to dominate the political 
agenda.59  Phillips asserts that equal participation is implied in the notion of democracy 
but, in principle, equal representation is not.  She states that “when democracy has 
become largely a matter of representing particular policies or programmes or ideas, this 
leaves a question-mark over why the sex of the representatives should matter.”60  
Although Phillips supports the justice argument, she inquires further into the concepts of 
democracy, participation, and representation. 
The second argument for gender parity discussed by Phillips is the argument of 
women interests.  This perspective posits that, in a democracy, all interests within 
society should be given representation to protect against tyrannical tendencies.61  This 
position, Phillips argues, rests upon three assumptions: “that women have a distinct and 
separate interest as women; that this interest cannot be adequately represented by men; 
and that the election of women ensures its representation.”62  Phillips carefully examines 
each assumption and concludes that the women’s interest argument can justify the need 
for a threshold number of women, but not necessarily an equal number of women, in a 
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democratic assembly.63  A threshold of women’s representation, she contends, may be 
enough to ensure that women’s interests are adequately considered in the decision 
making process.   
Phillips offers a third argument for gender parity in representative assemblies.  She 
attempts to address the problems associated with the seemingly opposing notions of 
participation and representation as well as democratic accountability and autonomy.    
She argues that “implicit in most feminist arguments [is] a conviction that changing the 
composition of existing elected assemblies is only part of a wider project of increasing 
and enhancing democracy.”64  Arguments for equal representation must be placed in the 
broader context of democracy and in conjunction with arguments of participatory 
democracy.  Gender parity, she argues, should be placed alongside arguments for 
dispersing political power, increasing the number of decision making centres, and 
“changing the balance between participation and representation.”65  Although Phillips 
believes that arguments of justice and women’s interests are strong, she concludes that 
the case for gender parity in representative assemblies made alongside arguments for 
greater participation and consultation are strongest.66    
Phillips suggests that the principle of equal political participation and the concept 
of descriptive representation are related in someway; however, she does not discuss in 
detail the theoretical connection between the two.67  Building upon Pitkin’s work, Iris 
Young provides a convincing argument about the interconnectedness between the 
concepts of political equality, participation and descriptive representation.  In her book 
Inclusion and Democracy, she argues that democracy and justice are theoretically 
connected and deliberative democracy is the best model for achieving just outcomes.68  
Just outcomes are those that are developed through a process of inclusion and political 
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equality.  Young aims to “conceptualize representation as a differential relationship 
among political actors engaged in a process extending over space and time.”69  Building 
upon Pitkin’s work, Young argues that representatives must be able to make decisions 
independently, while at the same time, remain connected to their constituents through 
discussion and consultation.70  Inclusive participation allows representatives to remain 
connected with their constituents.  Therefore, Young contends that the concepts of 
participation and representation are not mutually exclusive and actually require one 
another. 
Young rejects the claim that a representative can be a substitute for his or her 
constituency.  No group has a single interest or opinion that can be represented.71  Yet, 
she argues that special representation for certain groups is desirable and justifiable.  She 
identifies three aspects of an individual (or group) that can be represented.   First, 
representatives can promote selfish interests.  Second, they can represent opinions.72  
Third, Young claims that different social perspectives can be represented.  The latter 
point is of particular importance.  People have unique social perspectives “because 
differently positioned people have different experience, history, and social knowledge 
derived from that positioning.”73  In her view, the aspect of social perspective provides 
the basis for supporting an argument for descriptive representation in an inclusive, 
deliberative democracy.74  Including different social perspectives in the decision making 
process can alleviate feelings of alienation among marginalized groups, ensure that all 
groups are able to influence the political agenda, and can bring about relevant situated 
knowledge that contributes to good and just decisions.75 
In summary, Pitkin demonstrates the complex nature of the concept of 
representation and highlights the many different roles that representatives assume.  
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Although she recognizes the merits of descriptive representation, she does not fully 
support it in her theory of representation.  Contrary to Pitkin, both Phillips and Young 
argue for descriptive representation, albeit for different reasons.  Interestingly, however, 
Phillips and Young argue that participatory democracy and representation are 
compatible and, in fact, both necessary for a healthy democracy.  Phillips and Young 
provide sound theoretical explanations in support of those who continue to work toward 
more accurate representation in democratic institutions.  
The theories reviewed in this section consider the concept of representation as it is 
and what is should be.  Equally important are those theories that seek to explain why the 
practice of democracy has often failed to met democratic ideals.  Elite theories of 
democracy attempt to explain the concentration of power in the hands of the few and the 
homogenous nature of representative institutions.  
 
2.2.5 Elite Theories 
 
Elite theories attempt to explain the exercise of power by the few within a political 
community.  There are several schools of thought in the ‘elite theory’ camp; however 
this study focuses on one specific approach.76  This school of thought is one that 
examines a single, homogenous group of elites.  C. Wright Mills’ work, The Power 
Elite, is representative of this particular school.77  Mills perceives elites as a group of 
people that hold positions of power within society and he set out to determine who are 
these elites and from where they came.  After examining the origin and background of 
military, political, and economic elites in America, he argues that the “power elite” is a 
united and cohesive group of men that shared similar psychological affinities and social 
backgrounds.78  Mills rejects the pluralist notion that groups within society compete on 
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relatively equal playing fields thereby balancing the interests within society.  However, 
social background is not enough to account for this particular group of elites.  Mills also 
argues that the institutional landscape, the formal and informal structures of democratic 
institutions, helps certain people to acquire positions of power.79  In the end, Mills is 
skeptical about the prospects of democracy and suggests that popular control is, in his 
view, impossible to achieve.80        
In summary, Mills’ elite theory attempts to explain the use of power by elites 
within democratic societies.  He provides an institutional explanation after examining 
the formal and informal structures of American democratic institutions.  The formal and 
informal structures create barriers preventing many from being included in decision 
making centres.   
The exclusion of marginalized groups is not limited to national democratic 
institutions.  Although there are many theories of democracy and representation at the 
state level, democracy is practiced in local, community organizations as well. Co-
operatives are community-based organizations that are governed by democratic 
principles and some key theories here also concern democracy. 
   
2.3 Co-operative Democracy 
 
Formal co-operative organizations have existed for nearly two hundred years.81  In 
its “Statement of the Co-operative Identity 1995,” the International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA) defines a co-operative as “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
though a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.”82  This definition is 
widely accepted and used in the co-operative sector.  Co-operatives are also guided by a 
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common set of values and principles.  Co-operative values include self-help, self-
responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, solidarity, honesty, openness, social 
responsibility and caring for others.83  The seven co-operative principles provide the 
means for co-operatives to fulfill their commitment to co-operative values.   
The list of co-operative principles has changed and evolved over time in order to 
meet the needs of each generation.84  Today, the co-operative movement embraces the 
following principles: voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; 
member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and 
information; concern for community; and co-operation among co-operatives.85 
In his work, The Meaning of Rochdale: The Rochdale Pioneers and the Co-
operative Principles, Brett Fairbairn argues that the list of co-operative principles is to 
be considered minimal criteria in order for co-operatives to meet the needs of their 
members.86  Co-operatives should, at the very least, commit to implement each principle 
the best they can.  Of particular importance to this study is the second principle of 
democratic member control: “Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by 
their members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions.  
Men and women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership.  
In primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and 
co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner.”87  He notes that 
the principle of democratic governance has always been, either explicitly or implicitly, 
an integral part to co-operative organizations.  For example, the Rochdale Pioneers, the 
first well-known successful co-operative, did not explicitly state the principle of 
democratic governance.  Fairbairn explains:  
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This is not because democracy was unimportant to the Pioneers: their 
association with Owenism, Chartism, and working-class causes indicate 
democracy was an uppermost concern.  Most likely democracy was left out 
because it was taken for granted.  Friendly Societies, and probably all 
associations the founding members had ever encountered, all functioned in a 
democratic manner.  Curiously, then, one may take the omission of the 
principle of democracy as an indication of its centrality to Rochdale co-
operation.88   
 
Democracy is a defining feature of co-operative organizations.  However, the literature 
on democratic theory demonstrates that this is a difficult concept to put into practice. 
Several approaches to democracy discussed in the previous section are found 
implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, in the literature on co-operative democracy.  The 
purpose of the democratic process is interpreted differently within the body of literature 
on co-operative democracy.  However, there seems to be a strong emphasis on the 
developmental function of democracy.  There are three main approaches to studying co-
operative democracy: “cash register” democracy; “theatrical” democracy; and 
“participatory” (or “generative”) democracy. 
The theory of “cash register” democracy posits that democracy is a means to 
protect the interests of its members.  Much like theories of representative democracy, the 
“cash register” theory of democracy de-emphasizes the role of participation in the 
democratic process.  According to this school, members express their satisfaction with 
the co-operative and its governance by buying what it has to offer.89  In this view, if the 
co-operative is financially successful, then this is taken as concrete evidence that the 
members approve of the board’s decisions.  However, if the co-operative is financially 
unsuccessful, then members have expressed clearly their dissatisfaction with the 
governance of their co-operative.   
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In the second approach, “theatrical” democracy, members observe the board’s 
discussion and periodically ask questions.90  The board presents their reports to the 
audience (members) and the audience usually sits and listens.91  “Theatrical” democracy 
is demonstrated by the annual general meeting (AGM) and the emphasis on this event as 
the venue for democratic participation.  Members are able to ask questions to the board 
of directors but have little influence over the directors’ agenda.92  Co-operatives are 
often required by law to hold an AGM.  Trevena asserts that, as a result, the AGM is 
often perceived as sufficient for fulfilling a co-operative’s democratic duty.93   
In the third approach, “participatory” (or “generative”) democracy, the tenets are 
similar to the conceptions of democracy espoused by Mill and Pateman.  This is most 
often considered as the ideal form of democracy in co-operative organizations.94  Joel 
David Welty, for example, contends that participatory democracy is good for the 
development of the individual and the co-operative itself.95  Members are encouraged to 
be active members, to learn about important issues, and to express their thoughts and 
concerns to a responsive organization. 
It is clear that the co-operative principle of democratic member control is 
necessary to ensure that members’ needs are addressed and the organization remains 
economically viable.  Strangely, how democracy is supposed to be practiced in co-
operatives is often unclear and studies of co-operative democracy are few.  Democratic 
concepts such as equality, participation, and representation are pertinent to the practice 
of co-operative democracy.  The literature on co-operatives and board diversity 
demonstrates efforts to develop such concepts in the context of co-operative 
organizations. 
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2.4 Co-operatives and Board Diversity 
 
Analyzing the level of diversity present on governing boards is a new sort of 
inquiry that has largely developed over the last decade.  The corporate and non-profit 
worlds especially have begun to investigate the effects of board diversity on 
organizational performance.  In the co-operative sector, although governance issues are 
gaining more attention, there are few studies that examine the implications of the 
diversity problem on co-operative boards of directors.  Among extant works on this 
topic are studies of co-operative board composition, some explanations for the apparent 
lack of diversity in co-operative governance structures, and analyses of the economic, 
moral and democratic implications of the diversity problem for co-operatives.  Five 
important studies on the presence of women and minorities on the boards of co-
operatives are worth mentioning briefly.  
From 1995 to 1996, the Conseil Canadien de la Coopération (CCC) inquired into 
the difficulties surrounding the participation of women on the boards of directors in co-
operative organizations.  The findings are summarized in Boon for the Future: The 
Participation of Women in Co-operative Democracy.96  It found that women were 
disadvantaged by existing structures and patriarchal attitudes within the co-operative.  
For example, the CCC examined the role women play within the family.  For some 
women, the demands of parenting and households tasks left little time to be involved in 
their local co-operatives.97   The times and duration of board meetings often were not 
conducive for women with young children or with modest incomes.98  Also, the CCC 
reported that the organizational culture of some co-operatives was not conducive for 
women’s participation.  For example, sexism prevailed in some organizations.  In some 
cases, women were assumed to be secretaries or someone’s companion.99   
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The CCC recommends strategies for co-operatives to take in order to address the 
barriers that prevent women from participating in their co-operatives.  For example, co-
operatives were encouraged to develop new participatory structures, such as increasing 
the number of opportunities for members to meet.100  In addition to identifying the 
barriers for women’s participation in co-operative organizations, this study was also 
concerned with revitalizing co-operative democracy: “the issue of women is also that of 
all absent members in our co-operatives; in some ways, it is the issue of democracy 
itself.  This loss of democratic vitality, which seems to affect many co-operatives, may 
place limits on the capacity of executive teams to follow and understand changes in the 
needs of the members, and thus on the capacity of the co-operative to respond to these 
needs effectively.”101  The absence of women and other minority group members 
highlights the fact that certain members are excluded from the political process.  
Therefore, the principle of political equality is compromised.   
In a second important study, Research for Action, Leona Theis and Lou Hammond 
Ketilson sought to identify some barriers and means of support encountered by women 
as board members in decision making positions.102  The study consists of five case 
studies of co-operatives across Canada.  The researchers found that boards often fail to 
use gender neutral language and women are often excluded from prestigious 
committees.103  In their recommendations, Theis and Hammond Ketilson stress the 
importance of communication and the flow of information to all members about 
governance and recommend that co-operatives help make it easier for women with 
families and community responsibilities to participate as board members.104  The authors 
stress the importance of equity in co-operative organizations: “When co-operatives deal 
with issues that cluster around equity, they address questions that have to do with how 
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co-operative organizations ‘do democracy,’ and how they do business.  There is – and 
there ought to be – an expectation among members of co-operatives that as democratic 
organizations, they will strive to achieve equity for members and employees.”105  Co-
operatives claim to be inclusive organizations concerning their membership as well as 
their leadership structure, and they therefore should reflect this claim in practice. 
Third, a study conducted by Carol Hunter from the CCA in 1997 entitled “Women 
in Co-operatives: Some Benchmarks” was one of the earliest efforts to collect data about 
women on co-operative boards in Canada.106  Data was collected from 38 co-operative 
organizations from various sectors including agriculture, finance/insurance, services, 
retail, and associations/federations.107  At this time, women comprised 16.2 per cent of 
co-operative board members in Canada.108  This study also demonstrated that women’s 
participation on co-operative boards varies by sector.  For example, women made up 
47.7 per cent of board members in the service sector (daycare, housing, health) and only 
2.9 and 12.1 per cent of directors in the agriculture and finance/insurance sectors 
respectively.109  This report provides researchers and the co-operative sector in Canada 
with important benchmarks against which to measure current and future levels of 
women’s representation on co-operative boards. 
A fourth study is Leadership and Diversity: A Study of Demographic and 
Attitudinal Homogeneity in Saskatchewan’s Credit Union Governance Groups. 110   
Cristine de Clercy and Lou Hammond Ketilson study whether the composition of 
Saskatchewan credit union boards of directors reflects the demographic make-up of the 
provincial population.111  They report that Saskatchewan credit unions lack the diversity 
that appears in the general population.  This diversity problem has potential economic 
costs and raises concerns about the renewal and rejuvenation of Saskatchewan credit 
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union boards.112  Further, this diversity problem diminishes the democratic 
representation that is expected of co-operatives as member-based organizations.113  The 
researchers surveyed the attitudes of board members and found that many members 
believed that Saskatchewan’s credit union boards were more diverse that they actually 
are.114  Lastly, de Clercy and Hammond Ketilson conducted focus group sessions 
regarding the perceptions and experiences of sitting board members as well as those who 
were not board members.  The focus groups helped identify some key perceptions 
regarding barriers to board diversity as well as illuminate strategies to improve the 
recruitment and retention of new members. 
The final study was completed in 2004.  The CCA and Brown Governance 
conducted the first national survey on credit union and co-operative governance 
practices.115  The survey provides a benchmark to which future surveys and indicators of 
credit union and co-operative governance practices can be compared.  In Measuring Up: 
National Report on Credit Union Governance Practices, numerous board governance 
benchmarks were reported including areas such as composition, terms and tenures, 
selection and renewal, duties, structure and committees, and compensation.116  Although 
the report does not make specific policy recommendations, it marks an important step 
toward the much needed monitoring of credit union board practices for the future.  With 
such surveys, credit unions and co-operatives can monitor national governance norms 
across time and compare their governance practices with national norms.  Further, they 
enable credit union and co-operative owners and board members to identify governance 
practices they wish to improve on and design strategies targeted toward specific 
problems areas.  
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The literature on board diversity and co-operatives tends to be more specifically 
about women’s representation.  There are few studies that examined the diversity 
problem as it pertains to the representation of visible minorities.  For example, the most 
recent survey conducted by CCA and Brown Governance reports board composition in 
terms of gender only.  However, there are two studies that examine diversity beyond the 
categories of gender to include the representation of visible minorities.  In 2003, the 
CCA completed a comprehensive study of Canadian co-operatives.117  It found that over 
85% of responding co-operatives had no visible minorities on their board and over 95% 
of responding urban co-operatives had no visible minorities on their board.  The CCA 
states that the last finding “was surprising, too, given the multi-cultural make-up of 
urban communities.”118  In their recent study, de Clercy and Hammond Ketilson remark 
that Saskatchewan credit union boards were not representative of the provincial 
population in terms of Aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities, and visible 
minorities.119 
In summary, the literature on democratic theory provides a rich and extensive 
theoretical background upon which to draw toward developing a theoretical framework 
for this study.  Representative democratic theories tend to emphasize the protective 
function of democracy and to consider democracy as a means of resolving conflict and 
problems associated with democracy in large-scale, complex societies.  On the other 
hand, participatory democratic theories tend to argue that democracy is intrinsically 
good in that it educates citizens, promotes understanding and co-operation among 
citizens, and transforms conflict into consensus.  Feminists challenge established 
democratic notions such as the distinction between public and private spheres.  Okin 
criticizes liberal representative democracy on the grounds that the conception of 
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individual rights is based upon gendered notions.  Although some participatory theorists 
considered the workplace to be firmly situated within the public sphere of political 
activity, feminists such as Pateman contend that these theorists ignored the domestic 
division of labour.  Because women tend to do most of the work in the domestic realm, 
participatory theorists have not considered the impact of the public –private dichotomy 
on political equality between men and women. 
Theories on representation are particularly pertinent for the study of board 
diversity in democratic organizations.  Pitkin successfully demonstrates the complex 
nature of the concept of representation.  She describes several different conceptions of 
representation – formalistic, descriptive, and substantive – none of which, in her view, 
are adequate conceptions of representation.  According to Pitkin, the ability of 
representatives to remain responsive to their constituents is of key importance to any 
theory of representation.  Phillips provides several justifications for descriptive 
representation.  Descriptive representation can be supported by arguments from a justice 
perspective, from a women’s interest perspective, but most convincingly, in conjunction 
with arguments for more participatory democracy.  Young supports arguments for 
descriptive representation on the grounds that members of social groups share similar 
social perspectives that should be included in the democratic decision making process.  
Mills’ theory of elites argues that the formal and informal institutions in democratic 
societies perpetuate the existence of a single elite, an elite that shares similar social 
affinities with one another. 
The literature on co-operative democracy presents three main approaches to co-
operative democracy: “cash register” democracy, “theatrical” democracy, and 
participatory (or “generative”) democracy.  Trevena argues that participatory co-
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operative democracy is the most desirable for co-operatives and reflects many arguments 
made by the participatory theorists discussed above.  The literature on co-operatives and 
board diversity demonstrate that co-operatives embody a diversity problem.  This body 
of literature identifies key structural barriers and attitudes that prevent adequate 
representation of women on co-operative boards.  Also, the literature on board diversity 
has provided scholars and co-operatives themselves with recommendations and 
strategies to increase board diversity.  Significantly, studies on the representation of 
visible minorities in co-operative leadership structures are few.   
 
2.5 Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework used in this study draws from the literatures on 
democratic theory, representation, co-operative democracy and board diversity.  The 
framework considers the nature of co-operative democracy, member participation in co-
operatives, social group representation and board diversity, and member apathy.  First, 
the purpose of co-operative democracy is identified.  Second, the institutional 
arrangements that are necessary to realize co-operative democracy are considered.  
Representative and participatory institutions complement each other by ensuring 
efficient and accountable co-operative governance.  Third, the works of Pitkin and 
Young are drawn upon to develop a conception of representation that is compatible with 
arguments for descriptive representation on co-operative boards of directors.  Lastly, 
assumptions of Mills’ elite theory are used to explain the homogenous nature of co-
operative boards of directors. 
In this study, it is argued that descriptive representation helps fulfill the purpose of 
democracy in co-operative organizations.  Democracy in co-operatives serves two main 
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purposes.  In 1979, the Co-operative Future Directions Project included, among other 
areas of study, an examination of co-operative democracy.120  A statement of the 
purpose of co-operative democracy adopted by Federated Co-operatives Limited in 1981 
reads as follows: 
it is agreed that the democratic process and member relations activities should 
aid and encourage participation by members by observing these two purposes: 
1. To cultivate, between the members and the Co-operative, a relationship 
which stimulates members to a sense of loyalty and commitment to, and an 
appreciation of, the Co-operative as an organization they own; and 2. To 
facilitate and encourage communication by the members as to their wants, 
needs, expectation and views so as to provide information that will assist, 
guide, and influence the leadership team (board plus general manager) in the 
making of its decisions.121 
 
In short, here democracy serves to develop member loyalty and ensure that the 
governing body of the co-operative is responsive to its members. 
The purpose of democracy helps determine the institutions that are needed to put 
co-operative democracy into practice.  For co-operative democracy to develop member 
loyalty and respond to the needs of members, co-operatives must employ both 
representative and participatory methods of democracy.  First, representation on co-
operative board of directors addresses the practical difficulties associated with large 
scale democracy.  The larger the assembly of members, the less opportunities members 
will have to participate.122  Although co-operative organizations do not reach the same 
scale as most nations, many have substantial member bases.  For example, Van City 
Savings Credit Union in Vancouver, British Columbia, boasts over 300,000 members.123  
Means of ensuring meaningful representation are necessary for the simple reason that 
gathering 300,000 people in large or small groups to discuss all the activities and the 
direction of the credit union is impossible.  For such a large organization, effective 
governance requires representatives who are given authority to make decisions on behalf 
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of the membership.124  To be responsive to members, co-operatives need to ensure that 
their governing institutions work effectively and efficiently. 
Second, representative structures also ensure that board members are held 
accountable for their actions.  A form of arbitrary, de facto representation will likely 
emerge in a democracy in the absence of regular means to select representatives who 
formally represent the membership.125  De facto representation raises the concern that 
overbearing and aggressive members may control the discussion and overwhelmingly 
influence the decision making process.  Formal representation plays an important role in 
preventing unequal participation in the democratic process.  The electoral process both 
legitimizes representatives and holds them to account for their actions.  Unelected 
representatives are illegitimate and unaccountable to the membership. 
Representative democracy is necessary, but not sufficient, for co-operative 
democracy.  Although this study focuses on representative institutions, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that participatory institutions are vital to the success of co-operative 
democracy.  Co-operative democracy demands participation between elections.  Co-
operatives must have institutional arrangements that allow members to influence and 
contribute to the decision making process.  In its work, Making Membership Meaningful, 
the International Joint Project on Co-operative Democracy elegantly captures the need 
for participatory democracy:  
Participatory democracy offers the possibility of making representative 
democratic structures more effective, and of expanding democracy into 
operations.  Participatory democracy offers the advantages that a wider range 
of members can become involved in and knowledgeable about the co-op, they 
learn skills which will serve them well should they ever become board 
members, they become more committed to the co-op, the co-op finds it easier 
to stay in touch and to be responsive.126 
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Like many participatory democratic theories, co-operatives hold the belief that 
democracy contributes to individual and societal development.  Co-operative values and 
principles identify member and co-operative development as an organizational priority.  
For example, the fifth principle of “Education, Training, and Information” requires co-
operatives to provide their members with educational and training opportunities to learn 
about co-operatives and participate in their organization’s activities.127  Co-operatives 
that are responsive to their members and provide their members with opportunities to 
learn about their organization can promote a sense of loyalty among members. 
Although both representative and participatory institutions are necessary to fulfill 
the purposes of co-operative democracy, they are sometimes considered incompatible 
models of democracy.  For example, Phillips suggests that the equal right to participate 
is not necessarily analogous to the equal right of representation.128  Critics of 
participatory democracy, she argues, often assert that representative government is more 
desirable because it removes the requirement of participation.129  By removing the 
requirement of participation, citizens do not have to be present in the decision making 
process.  In a representative democratic system, equal participation is guaranteed by 
allotting each person one vote.  In this view, the relationship between representation and 
participation is one of substitution: representation removes the need for participation in a 
democratic society. 
However, the view discussed by Phillips is a narrow conception of representation, 
one that does not capture the meaning of representation in its entirety.  In the co-
operative context, an overwhelming focus on the principle of “one member, one vote” 
demonstrates a tendency to conceive the relationship between representation and 
participation as one of substitution.  For example, Trevena argues that an overwhelming 
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focus on fulfilling the legislative requirements of having an AGM and electing board 
members has weakened co-operative democracy.130  He contends that some co-
operatives believe that democratic control is successfully achieved by simply holding an 
AGM.131  In this view, emphasizing the AGM and member voting rights has come at the 
expense of member engagement and participation.   
Pertinent to this study is that this narrow conception of representation also 
oversimplifies the complex nature of the concept of representation.  The notion of “one 
member, one vote” emphasizes the role of elections as a tool to legitimize the actions of 
representatives and hold them to account for those actions.  This demonstrates what 
Pitkin refers to as the “formalistic view” of representation.132  The problem with this 
view is that it does not indicate what representatives actually do or what good or bad 
representation is.133  To be sure, authorizing and holding representatives to account is 
important.  It is, nevertheless, only part of the concept of representation. 
The concept of representation employed in this study reflects the work of Pitkin 
and Young.  The concept of representation has multiple aspects of which are employed 
at different times and in different contexts.  In this view, representation includes the 
formalities of authorizing representatives to act and of holding them to account.  Also, 
representatives are not to be conceived as simply delegates that always consults their 
constituents or agents who do not consult with their constituents.  Rather, representatives 
must be independent enough to ensure efficient governance and, at the same time, 
remain connected and responsive to the membership.  Although all aspects of 
representation need to be fulfilled to ensure effective co-operative democracy, the focus 
of this study is on the ability of representatives to remain connected and responsive to 
the membership. 
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This study adopts the assumption that board diversity is one way to ensure that co-
operative board members remain connected and responsive to their membership, an 
important feature of good democratic governance.  Descriptive representation refers to a 
representative assembly that closely resembles the demographic composition of the 
electorate.  Those analysts who argue for increasing board diversity in co-operative 
organizations usually refer to some form of descriptive representation on the boards of 
directors.  The term “board diversity” is often defined as the inclusion of people with 
different demographic characteristics - such as gender, race, ethnicity, age, religion, 
occupational and professional background, economic status, physical and mental 
disability, and culture - on the board.  The relationship between board diversity and co-
operative democracy seems to appeal to an intuitive belief that the composition of the 
board of directors should be very close to the composition of the membership.  Consider 
the following statement by the Saskatchewan Credit Union System: 
Credit Unions operate under the co-operative democratic theory.  One member 
with one vote elects boards of directors.  Ultimately, boards are representative 
of the people who are members.  This includes women, young people, visible 
minorities and people with disabilities, etc. 
 
Under this model, the goal of every credit union is to ensure that the decision 
making circles reflect the diversity of the membership served.  For this reason, 
at a minimum, participation by women, Aboriginal people, visible minorities 
and persons with disabilities is essential.134 
 
As demonstrated above, arguments for board diversity rest upon the assumption that the 
equal right to participation is related to the equal right to representation.   
The complex nature of the concept of representation requires an examination of the 
relationship between participation and representation.  Before this relationship is 
discussed, it is necessary to address two main criticisms of descriptive representation.  
Critics of descriptive representation argue that there is no theoretical relationship 
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between the equal right to representation and the equal right to participation.  First, 
critics argue that members of social groups do not share one particular interest.  Pitkin 
illustrates this view when she states that “behind all the applications of the descriptive 
view to political life hovers the recurrent ideal of the perfect replica, the flawless image, 
the map which contains everything.”135  For example, one woman cannot represent all 
women because other social characteristics, such as age, ethnicity, and religion, make it 
impossible to identify one interest that applies to all women.  Group interests cannot be 
identified, therefore, critics argue, the argument for descriptive representation loses its 
persuasiveness. 
The second criticism is that those who argue for a more demographically accurate 
representative assembly focus on individuals “being something rather than doing 
something.”136  Pitkin charges that this view of representation ignores the most basic 
task of representatives, which is to govern.137  She argues that those who typify the 
electorate are only capable of reporting the views of their constituents to the 
representative assembly.138  The ability to report constituents’ views does not, however, 
mean that representatives necessarily govern well.139  Representatives, she continues, 
are usually abnormal in the sense that they are more articulate than the typical person.140
According to Pitkin, descriptive representation is only useful to the extent that 
representatives can provide representative assemblies with the views of their 
constituents. 
  
Despite its critics, descriptive representation continues to be considered a pertinent 
issue in democratic entities.  Calls for increased representation of marginalized groups 
are perennially expressed.  Young provides an alternative conception of social groups 
and group representation that helps explain the persistence of those concerned with 
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diversity and representation.  Group politics, she contends, is often conceived using what 
she terms “logic of substance.”141  The “logic of substance” identifies group belonging 
according to the presence of some essential attribute within an individual.142  However, 
Young conceives social group differentiation in terms of relational, rather than 
substantial, difference.  One’s social experience and social relationships are greatly 
influenced by one’s position within society.143  Different social histories, experiences 
and knowledge generate, what Young calls, social perspectives.144  Social perspectives 
are particular points of view, backgrounds for which analysis of problems, questions and 
issues begin.145  Social perspectives only provide the conditions under which interests 
and opinions are formed, but do not determine one’s interests and opinions.146  Although 
each individual has their own unique mixture of experiences and social knowledge, 
Young importantly states that “we must avoid, however, the sort of individualism that 
would conclude from this fact that any talk of structured social positions and group-
defined social location is wrong, incoherent, or useless.”147  It is necessary to 
acknowledge and recognize the experiences shared by structured social groups.  The 
conceptualization of social groups in terms of relational rather than substantive 
categories does not assume that individual group members have identical interests while, 
at the same time, does not ignore the impact of social structures on an individual’s 
life.148   
The conception of social groups in relational terms addresses the criticisms of 
descriptive representation presented by Pitkin and provides a starting point for 
understanding the relationship between equal representation and participation.  The 
argument for descriptive representative becomes stronger if it is seen as a means to 
include a variety of social group perspectives.  Descriptive representation in co-
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operatives is important for effective and responsive representation.  A representative 
must be conceived as speaking for their constituents instead of requiring them to speak 
as their constituents.149  Representatives are not substitutes for their constituents because 
representatives cannot be identical to their constituents.150  However, they can act for 
constituents by remaining connected and responsive to them.  A strong connection 
between members and board directors not only requires directors that represent different 
interests and opinions, but also share the various social perspectives that exist within the 
co-operative’s membership.  Thus, the representation of the membership’s social 
perspectives is a component of good representation. 
Descriptive representation also improves the decision making process and the 
outcomes of that process.  It ensures that those who have been traditionally absent from 
decision making centres are able to influence the decision making agenda.151  The 
inclusion of different social perspectives provides an opportunity for the board of 
directors to identify important membership concerns that may not have been previously 
considered.  Moreover, the inclusion of different social perspectives brings new 
understanding of issues to the decision making process.  The more views that are 
considered, the more comprehensive the decision making process is likely to be.  In the 
end, better understanding of issues and problems by the board of directors is likely to 
bring about better decisions. 
This study shares two main assumptions of Mills’ elite theory.  First, this study 
assumes that some groups wield more power than others in the democratic process.  The 
pluralist notions that interests compete on relatively equal playing is rejected.  C. Wright 
Mills called this “romantic pluralism” and argues that the balance of power theory has a 
short-term focus and can only explain temporary alliances.152  If one examines political 
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elites over a long period of time, they would observe that some groups consistently 
occupy positions of power.  If equality of bargaining power truly exists, then different 
groups would have their interests realized.  The under representation of some social 
groups such as women and visible minorities suggests that these groups have been 
systematically excluded from the democratic process.153  Moreover, governing elites 
share similar social affinities and backgrounds, as Mills observed.154  Likewise, board 
members also tend to share similar social affinities and backgrounds.  
The second elite theory assumption adopted by this study holds that the formal and 
informal structures of power perpetuate the under representation of women and visible 
minorities on co-operative boards of directors.  Mills attempts to explain why certain 
social groups are able to acquire, and hold onto, positions of power.155  First, formal 
structures may prevent some people from participating.  For example, in co-operatives, 
formal structures and policies may include democratic institutions such as board size, the 
location, time, and date of elections and board meetings, or recruitment policies.  Formal 
democratic practices are those which are written down in policy statements or 
organizational rules and bylaws.  Second, Mills notes that informal structures are also 
important.156  Informal democratic practices include informal organizational norms and 
practices that indicate “the way things are done around here.”157  For example, informal 
norms and practices in co-operatives may include the type of language used, the manner 
of welcoming new board members, or even how formal policies are followed or adhered 
to.  Informal democratic practices are those which are unwritten but no less influential 
than formal democratic practices. 
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2.6 Summary 
The overall objectives of this chapter were to overview the extant literature on 
democracy, representation, co-operative democracy, and board diversity and to develop 
a theoretical framework for this study.  Hobbes, Locke, Schumpeter, and Dahl provided 
some compelling arguments for representative democracy.  Effective democratic 
governance in co-operatives requires representatives to be authorized to act for the 
membership and to be held accountable for their actions.  Also, like large-scale, complex 
societies, co-operatives must confront the practical obstacle of size for mass 
participation by formally and legitimately electing representatives.  The theories on 
representative democracy do not, however, adequately consider important democratic 
principles such as equality and participation.  Participatory theorists, such as Mill, 
Pateman, and Barber, contribute to this study’s theoretical framework with their 
discussions on the intrinsic worth of democracy.  Co-operative democracy can, and 
should, provide members with opportunities for individual member development as well 
as opportunities for members to contribute to organizational development.  Both 
participatory and feminist theorists highlight the need to examine the issues of political 
equality in a democratic entity.  As demonstrated by Okin and Pateman, successful 
democracy and the achievement of political equality sometimes requires an examination 
of gender roles and the ability of women to participate in the democratic process.   
The concept of representation is of central importance to this study.  Together, the 
theories of representation by Pitkin, Phillips, and Young offered several ways to 
conceptualize the concept of representation.  Pitkin’s view of representation as a 
temporal concept that has many aspects is particularly useful.  Representatives are 
authorized to act and held to account for their actions.  Also, representatives are 
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delegates as well as agents at different times throughout a representative’s term.  Phillips 
and Young, however, add to the concept of representation with their views of descriptive 
representation.  Arguments for board diversity in co-operatives organizations are 
arguments for descriptive representation and better democratic governance.  Board 
diversity is an important component of good democratic governance as it is one way to 
ensure that the social perspectives which are present in the membership are also present 
in the decision making process.  The inclusion of various social perspectives is one way 
to make certain that representatives remain connected and responsive to the co-
operative’s membership. 
Currently, most co-operative boards tend to be homogenous in terms of 
composition and representation.  Mills’ argument that formal and informal democratic 
structures prevent the participation of certain social groups is supported by the empirical 
evidence in the literature on co-operatives and board diversity.  The works of the CCC, 
Theis and Hammond Ketilson, and de Clercy and Hammond Ketilson suggest that 
structural barriers, such as board size and sexist attitudes, among many others, have 
contributed to the exclusion of women on co-operative boards of directors.  The absence 
of women and visible minorities on co-operative boards of directors suggest that 
members do not have equal political power within co-operative organizations.   
The lack of diversity in co-operative governance structures is problematic for two 
reasons.  First, it suggests that there may be the systematic exclusion of certain social 
groups and therefore social perspectives from the governance activities of the 
organization.  As democratic organizations, co-operatives have a responsibility to ensure 
that all members have an equal opportunity to participate in, and influence, the decision 
making process.  Second, it suggests that co-operative organizations may not be meeting 
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the social and economic needs of their membership.  It has already been established that 
democracy is important for the social and economic success of a co-operative’s success.  
Enhancing board diversity can provide co-operative organizations with insights about 
issues and concerns that are important to the membership.  To achieve inclusive 
governance and realize the co-operative competitive advantage, the barriers to, and 
facilitators of, board diversity must be identified.  It is the objective of this study to 
identify formal and informal structures that are assumed to inhibit and facilitate the 
inclusion of women and visible minorities on co-operative boards of directors.  The next 
chapter focuses on studying these structures empirically within select cases. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, PROPOSITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the merits of descriptive representation and board 
diversity were discussed.  This chapter has two objectives: to present the overarching 
theoretical propositions of this study and to describe its methodological approach.  First, 
the core research questions are presented and eight specific propositions are discussed.  
Second, the methodological approach is reviewed.  As well, case selection criteria are 
reviewed and the two case studies are introduced.  Lastly, the data sources and analytical 
strategies used in this study are presented. 
 
3.2 Research Questions and Propositions 
 
  The literature on co-operatives and board diversity reflects a keen interest 
among researchers and the co-operative sector to better understand board diversity in co-
operative organizations.  Extant research on board diversity has provided some insight 
into the role of gender representation on co-operative boards.  Importantly, recent 
empirical evidence has confirmed that there is a diversity problem in Canadian co-
operatives.1  Also, it reveals that women encounter specific barriers while attempting to 
secure board positions.2  Lastly, recommendations about strategies that facilitate board 
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diversity have been discussed.3  These works provide an important foundation for this 
inquiry, and have generated additional questions concerning the phenomenon of board 
diversity.  For example, how have some co-operative boards achieved diversity? Why 
was it important for these boards to pursue diversity?  What strategies, if any, were 
implemented to achieve diversity?  Which strategies were successful and unsuccessful?  
Were some strategies more readily accepted than others and why?  What factors 
contribute to sustainable board diversity?  Answers to these questions would be useful 
for co-operative boards interested in increasing their level of diversity. 
There are few empirical examples of diverse boards and, therefore, there is a 
rather limited understanding of board diversity on the part of researchers and co-
operatives.  This work focuses on understanding key factors that contribute to board 
diversity.  This study has two core research questions.  First, how do boards achieve 
diversity?  Second, how do diverse boards maintain their diversity?  The answers to 
these questions are likely to be complex and influenced by the historical and institutional 
realities of each organization.  Nevertheless, it is possible to offer some theoretical 
propositions by drawing upon existing studies on board diversity and from the field of 
political science, particularly works on democracy and gender representation.   
To be clear, this thesis does not seek to examine or explain changes in the 
demographic composition of co-operative boards.  It does not consider instances where a 
board has transformed from a homogenous board to a diverse board, or vice versa.  
Rather, the main objective of this study is to identify key characteristics of both 
homogenous and diverse boards, and to examine how representational diversity is 
maintained.  A comparison of diverse and homogenous boards can shed light on the key 
factors that inhibit or facilitate diversity in co-operative leadership structures. 
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This study is based on four key areas of inquiry.  These four areas are problem 
recognition, formal diversity policies, proactive recruitment strategies, and responsive 
governance.  Under each area, two specific theoretical propositions are posited.  These 
propositions rest upon the basic assumption that the achievement board diversity 
requires deliberate action aimed toward including members of marginalized groups.  
Left to their own devices, boards will not diversify their representational characteristics.  
Without changing board and electoral procedures, practices and policies, the status quo 
of homogeneity will continue. 
The first main theme of this study is problem recognition.  There are several 
reasons why a board may believe board homogeneity to be problematic and board 
diversity to be beneficial, as discussed in the first chapter in detail.  For example, 
although researchers are unable to prove causation, studies show that there is a 
correlation between economically successful organizations and diverse boards.4  As 
well, diversity is believed to improve the decision making processes because directors 
can draw upon a broader set of experiences and perspectives.  This wide range of 
experience and knowledge is believed to create a better understanding of issues, and 
contribute to the creation of innovative ideas.  Some boards may be concerned about 
improving the democratic functioning of their co-operative.  In addition to the 
requirement that all members have equal voting rights, the principle of democratic 
equality requires that all members have an equal opportunity to serve in leadership 
positions, regardless of gender or ethnic background.   
Whatever the specific rationale or rationales for taking action, some homogenous 
boards act to diversify their leadership representation.  Once a leadership group 
diversifies, it is possible that it will remain diverse over time, and not return to its former 
 55
homogenous state.  Examples from the political world guide this work’s theory here.  In 
her study entitled “Women and the Public Sphere in Saskatchewan, 1905 to 2005,” de 
Clercy found that after reaching the highest level of female representation in the 
Saskatchewan legislature in 1995 with 24.4 per cent, the 1999 and 2003 provincial 
elections resulted in a reversal of female representation with 17 per cent and 18 per cent 
respectively.5  However, the level of women’s representation did not revert to pre-1990 
levels.   
Gains in the level of women’s representation in national and provincial 
institutions, as well as co-operative organizations should be celebrated.  The dramatic 
growth in the number of women in the paid workforce and post-secondary institutions 
over the last few decades demonstrates a considerable achievement toward gender 
equality.  These factors likely contributed to the overall increase in women’s 
representation in formal political institutions and co-operative organizations.  Still, 
structural barriers continue to impede women’s participation in the public sphere, and 
the issue of women’s representation needs to be constantly addressed.  Studies on 
women’s participation in representative institutions show that change has been slow.  
For instance, although women in Saskatchewan gained the right to vote in 1916, it was 
not until the 1960s when women consistently participated in provincial politics, and not 
until the 1990s when women made significant gains in Saskatchewan’s elected 
assembly.6   
Furthermore, it is not certain that increases in the level of women’s 
representation will inevitably continue as a result of workforce or educational gains.  In 
the past decade, for example, the level of women’s representation in Canadian political 
institutions has stagnated around 20 per cent, despite a marked increase in women’s 
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representation from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.7  Therefore, it is important for 
representative institutions, including credit union boards, to keep the issue of women’s 
representation a priority and to continue to monitor the overall level, and the rate of 
progress, of women’s representation. 
So, as concerns problem recognition, this thesis identifies two propositions: 
1A. Boards that are homogenous in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not consider homogeneity, or lack of diversity, to be 
problematic. 
 
1B. Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will consider homogeneity, or lack of diversity, to be problematic. 
 
From these propositions, several sorts of board behaviour are expected.  For example, in 
view of proposition 1A, it is expected that homogenous boards will fail to view their 
homogeneity as a problem.  It is expected that they will not discuss the issue of diversity 
during board meetings, or publicly and explicitly identify a diversity problem in annual 
reports and members newsletters.  Similarly, as regards proposition 1B, diverse boards 
are expected to regularly refer to the problems flowing from representational 
homogeneity at board meetings and in annual reports and member newsletters.  Further, 
it is expected that diverse boards will monitor current levels of diversity to avoid the 
problem of representational homogeneity.  In effect, it is expected that diverse boards 
will not revert to homogeneity. 
The second theme guiding this inquiry is formal diversity policies.  A formal 
commitment to diversity is a written policy statement that expresses the board’s 
commitment to equality and equity.  It indicates that the representation of women and 
visible minorities is an important issue for the board.  A policy of this sort is difficult to 
ignore, and may serve as an explicit reminder to the membership and board members of 
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the board’s commitment to achieve diverse representation.  Furthermore, it ensures that 
future boards are aware that the board sought to achieve diversity.  
Therefore, this study has two specific theoretical propositions concerning formal 
diversity policies: 
2A. Boards that are homogenous in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not have a formal diversity policy. 
 
2B. Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will have a formal diversity policy. 
 
In light of proposition 2A, it is expected homogenous boards not to ensure the 
representation of women or visible minorities by means of a formal diversity policy.  
With reference to proposition 2B, diverse boards are expected to have a formal diversity 
policy guaranteeing a minimum level of gender and ethnic representation on the board. 
The third area of inquiry is proactive recruitment strategies.  Proactive 
recruitment strategies include a purposive effort to identify and ask women and visible 
minorities to stand for election, and to publicly acknowledge the need for more female 
and visible minority candidates.  Such recruitment efforts are specifically aimed at 
facilitating the participation of women and visible minority candidates in board 
elections.  Co-operative boards face the challenge of deciding to what extent they are 
involved in the selection of board members.8  Because co-operatives are democratic 
organizations, some people believe the board should not interfere with the selection of 
candidates in any way.9  The board may be perceived as interfering in the democratic 
process by providing some candidates with an “unfair” advantage and, therefore, 
increasing their probability of winning the election.10  Some people may perceive the 
board’s involvement as a violation of the democratic principle of equality.  However, 
many demographic groups are chronically under represented on credit union boards, 
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suggesting that many recruitment processes do not effectively reach certain demographic 
groups, or that existing practices are biased towards white males.  Proactive recruitment 
is one way to reach out to women and visible minorities and ensure diverse 
representation. 
Proactive recruitment strategies are likely to increase diversity on the board for 
several reasons.  First, they encourage women and visible minorities who may not have 
otherwise run for the board.11  Also, proactive recruitment strategies communicate the 
message that women and visible minorities are welcome on the board.  While such 
strategies may not have a visible effect in any one election, over time they signal 
inclusiveness to under represented groups.  Lastly, simply asking a person to consider 
running for a position on the board may give them the confidence they need to stand for 
election, and so mobilizing under represented group members into the electoral process.   
So, as concerns proactive recruitment strategies, this study offers two theoretical 
propositions: 
3A. Boards that are homogenous in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
3B. Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
In view of these propositions, boards are expected to exercise certain types of 
recruitment practices.  For instance, as regards proposition 3A, it is expected that 
homogenous boards will not proactively recruit female and visible minority candidates 
to run for the board.  They are not expected to publicly announce the need to increase 
the level of representational diversity on the board, or overtly call women and visible 
minorities to run for the board in organizational documents.  As well, such boards are 
not expected to informally recruit for representational diversity through personal 
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networks or encouragement.  In view of proposition 3B, diverse boards are expected to 
deliberately seek representational diversity with overt and public calls for women and 
visible minorities to put their names forward for election.  As well, diverse boards are 
expected to identify members of under represented groups and to provide such 
individuals with personal encouragement and support throughout the electoral process. 
The final area of inquiry is responsive governance.  It is believed that a critical 
mass of women and visible minorities ensures that minority group perspectives are 
included in the decision making process and, as a result, are reflected in board policy 
and practices.12  It is assumed that women and visible minorities identify with, and 
participate in, governance structures that are responsive to their specific needs and 
identities.13  Studies on women’s representation suggest that 20 per cent women’s 
representation has not resulted in an acceptable rate of progress in Canadian political 
institutions.14  Therefore, a critical mass of women and visible minorities is defined as a 
level in excess of 20 per cent.  In this study, a critical mass is considered 30 per cent 
representation of women or visible minorities for a period of at least three years.  
Although a board may achieve such diversity levels in a single year, it is not likely 
minority group perspectives will influence board policies and practices over such a short 
period of time. 
In effect, this study provides two theoretical propositions concerning responsive 
governance: 
4A. Boards that do not have a critical mass of women or visible minorities will 
not demonstrate responsive governance practices. 
 
4B. Boards that have a critical mass of women or visible minorities will 
demonstrate responsive governance practices. 
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In view of responsive governance, certain kinds of policies and norms of behaviour are 
expected.  For example, as regards proposition 4A, boards without a critical mass of 
diversity are not expected to demonstrate more traditional board practices including the 
use of masculine language in organizational documents, pre-determined and rigid 
meeting dates and times that favour those with traditional work schedules, and the 
absence of gender- and culturally-sensitive policies aimed to facilitate the participation 
of women and visible minorities.  Further, it is also expected that women who serve on 
homogenous boards will not serve in influential board positions, such as Chair or Vice 
Chair.  Likewise, as concerns proposition 4B, boards with a critical mass of diversity are 
expected to use gender neutral language in organizational documents, have flexible dates 
and times of board meetings to accommodate different lifestyles, and have gender- and 
culturally-sensitive policies such as childcare provision, or the recognition of various 
cultural celebrations or events on which board meetings would not be held.  Finally, it is 
expected that boards with a critical mass of diversity will consistently promote women 
and visible minorities to key board positions. 
In summary, this study has eight theoretical propositions that fall under four 
main areas of inquiry: problem recognition, formal diversity policies, proactive 
recruitment strategies, and responsive governance.  The eight specific theoretical 
propositions of this research project are based on extant studies in several fields of social 
science, and they provide a method for exploring and explaining how representational 
diversification occurs in co-operative leadership cohorts.  The next section provides the 
rationale for this study’s research method and design. 
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3.3 Methodological Framework and Operationalization 
 
This study adopts the case study method, and there are three reasons for choosing 
this method.  First, as Robert K. Yin states, “the distinctive need for case studies arise 
out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.  In brief, the case study 
method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-
life events.”15  The phenomenon of board diversity is complex in that it is likely 
influenced by many contextual conditions.  For instance, every board has its own 
processes and norms of behaviour that have been shaped by its unique history.  Case 
studies are a desirable research method when contextual conditions are important and 
pertinent to studying a particular phenomenon.16   
Second, the explanatory and exploratory nature of the research questions 
discussed above requires the researcher to draw upon multiple sources of information 
and make linkages between certain events that happened over time.17  Yin states that 
“the ability to trace changes over time is a major strength of case studies – which are not 
limited to cross-sectional or static assessments of a particular situation.”18  For example, 
information concerning changes in policy or board practices may provide insight into 
changes in board composition.  The case study method allows for further inquiry into 
potential linkages between separate events. 
As well, case studies are appropriate where the researcher has little or no control 
over the phenomenon being studied.  Yin states that “the case study is preferred in 
examining contemporary events when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated.”19  
In this study, historical and contemporary events such as past and present board policies 
and board member behaviour cannot be manipulated as in experimental laboratory 
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research.  Instead, multiple data sources, including personal interviews, are drawn upon 
to evaluate the theoretical propositions of this study.   
For this analysis, the case study method is superior to other research methods, 
such as surveys or experiments.  Surveys and experiments are not suitable for providing 
information regarding the contextual conditions of a phenomenon.  As Yin explains, 
“the survey designer…constantly struggles to limit the number of variables to be 
analyzed (and hence the number of questions asked) to fall safely within the number of 
respondents that can be surveyed.”20  Surveys are more suitable if the research goal is to 
determine the prevalence of a phenomenon.21  In contrast to case studies, experiments 
are designed to remove contextual conditions toward examining a small number of 
precise variables.22  Finally, with the experimental method, behaviour is often 
manipulated in a controlled and systematic manner.  In this case, some groups cannot be 
treated differently to manipulate certain kinds of behaviour.23 
The research design of this study is a multiple-case design, whereby two cases 
are selected to test key theoretical propositions more than once.24  This is what Yin calls 
“replication” logic which aims to test a particular theory as opposed to a “sampling” 
logic that seeks to “reflect the entire universe or pool.”25  Also, this study relies on 
analytic generalization as opposed to statistical generalization.  Yin explains that “in 
analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of 
results to some broader theory.”26  Analytic generalizations require that the theoretical 
propositions under examination are supported by more than one case.  Therefore, 
multiple-case study designs expand the external generalizability of the study’s 
findings.27   
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The concept of theoretical replication guides the selection of the two case 
studies.  A homogenous board is selected as the first case study, and a diverse board is 
selected as the second case study.  One way to study how boards achieve diversity is to 
compare the similarities and differences of diverse and homogenous boards, and 
highlight key factors to explain the different outcomes in board composition.  According 
to Yin, “each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results 
(a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a 
theoretical replication).”28  It is expected that each case study would yield different 
results but for predictable reasons.  Taken together, the case studies ensure that 
theoretical replication is possible. 
The next sections review the case selection criteria, introduce the specific case 
studies, and explain the analytic strategies used in this study. 
 
3.4 Case Selection Criteria and Data Sources 
 
The two case studies of this research project were active credit union 
organizations during the 1990s and early 2000s, and there are two main rationales 
guiding case selection.  First, there were substantial gains in women’s representation in 
legislative politics during the 1990s.  For example, the Saskatchewan legislature saw 
women’s representation increase from 7.8 per cent in 1982 and 1986 to 18.2 per cent in 
1991, and 24.4 per cent in 1995.29  Although the number of women dropped in 1999 and 
2003, women continued to comprise between 17.2 and 19 per cent of elected officials.30  
At the same time, women’s representation in the House of Commons climbed from 13.3 
per cent in 1988 to 18 per cent in 1993.31  In 1997, 2000 and 2004 elections, over 20 per 
cent of Members of Parliament were women.32  Over 10 million Canadians – 
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approximately one third of the Canadian population – are members of credit unions.33  
Credit unions are present in both urban and rural communities and are active in all 
Canadian provinces.  As well, all rely on one member, one vote democratic practices.  
Given this deep and widespread membership base, the credit union sector is well-
situated to reflect broader national trends, including marked increases of women in 
elected positions. 
Next, the case studies are both situated in the Greater Vancouver Area in British 
Columbia.  Credit union legislation falls under provincial jurisdiction and, therefore, 
credit union regulation differs across provinces.  To ensure that the impact of legislation 
is similar for each unit of analysis, the case studies are both located in one province.  As 
well, to study the representation of women and visible minorities, it is necessary to 
ensure that the credit unions have a significant number of women and visible minorities 
in their membership.  It is well-known that immigrants tend to settle in large urban areas.  
For example, Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto have the highest immigrant populations 
in the country.  The total population of Vancouver is nearly 2 million people.34  Over 
725,000 people in Vancouver are members of over ten different visible minority 
groups.35  This suggests approximately one third of Vancouver’s population is 
considered a visible minority.  Also, women comprise half of Vancouver’s population.  
Given the number of women and visible minorities that live in the Vancouver area, it is 
reasonable to assume that the membership of credit unions in the Greater Vancouver 
Area is similar to the general population. 
There were a small number of suitable cases to choose from for this study.  For 
some credit unions, archived annual reports and other pertinent documents were located 
off-site and were not easily accessible.  Others cited privacy concerns as reasons for not 
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participating in this study.  From the cohort of potential cases, the boards of Surrey 
Metro Savings (SMS) Credit Union and Coast Capital Savings (CCS) Credit Union were 
selected as case studies for this research project.    
In 2002, SMS merged with CCS. 36  The merger between the credit unions 
reflects a recent trend toward consolidation in the credit union sector.  This trend is 
demonstrated by the decrease in the number of credit unions from 1990 to 2001.  The 
total number of credit unions and caisses populaires in Canada decreased from 2,700 in 
1990, to 1,595 in 2001.37  Yet, the number of “points of service” – locations and 
Automated Teller Machines – remained the same or increased, and membership in credit 
unions and caisses populaires has grown steadily.38  As a result, the number of credit 
unions has decreased while the average asset size of credit unions has grown.39  There 
are several reasons credit unions consolidate, for instance, to improve customer service, 
to retain staff by providing them with more exciting career opportunities, to increase 
profitability, and to improve operational efficiencies.40 
Here, two points about the way the term “diversity” is conceived in this study 
should be made.  First, it is recognized that the term “diversity” may be viewed as a 
continuum whereby one board is considered more diverse than another.  On the other 
hand, however, it must be recognized that the level of diversity in representational 
structures is pertinent for those studying the inclusiveness of democratic institutions and 
electoral processes.  While there are varying degrees of representational diversity, there 
is a point where the level of diversity is significant and sufficiently high so that one can 
expect such boards to display different characteristics than those that have not reached 
this level of diversity.  To undertake a comparative study of diverse and homogenous 
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boards, one must determine what constitutes a clear achievement of representational 
diversity.   
Second, there are many ways to study diversity on boards.  Some subcategories 
of diversity include gender, ethnic, age, educational, income and geographic diversity, to 
name only a few.  In some cases, directors may belong to more than one subcategory. 
Although each subcategory may be used as an indicator of diversity, gender and ethnic 
diversity are selected as specific indicators of board diversity for this study.  In light of 
these two points, a diverse board is defined as a board that has at least 30 per cent 
representation from women and visible minorities for this study.  Conversely, a 
homogenous board is considered a board that has less than 30 per cent representation 
from women and visible minorities.  During the case selection process it was revealed 
that there were no credit union boards that were ethnically diverse.  As a result, the case 
selections reflect this study’s primary focus on the representation of women.   
 
3.4.1 Surrey Metro Savings Credit Union Board of Directors 
 
The first case study is the SMS Board of Directors from 1995 to 2002.  This 
credit union opened in 1947 and eventually became a leading financial institution in the 
Fraser Valley region in the Greater Vancouver Area, one of the fastest population 
growth areas in Canada.  By 2001, SMS had grown to be the third largest credit union in 
Canada, with approximately $2.7 billion dollars in total assets. 
A great deal of the success at SMS can be attributed to the strong leadership 
demonstrated by many dedicated board members.  Yet, the SMS Board was 
homogenous in terms of gender.  From 1995 to 2002, the Board consisted of 9 directors.  
During this period, women comprised an average of 11.1 per cent of directors, and one 
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visible minority in 1995 and 1996.  The lack of gender representation on the SMS Board 
is not unusual.  In fact, and as discussed in the preceding chapter, it is typical of many 
co-operative and credit union organizations.  The SMS Board was chosen because it is 
homogenous in its gender composition during the period under study. 
 
3.4.2 Coast Capital Savings Credit Union Board of Directors 
 
The second case study is the CCS Board of Directors from 2001 to 2006.  CCS 
was formed when Pacific Coast Savings Credit Union and Richmond Savings Credit 
Union merged on December 31, 2000.41  CCS serves the communities of Vancouver 
Island and the Greater Vancouver Area.  The CCS Board of Directors is selected 
because it achieved the definition of a diverse board (minority group representation 
exceeding 30 per cent).  The total number of directors on the Board varied from 18 
directors in 2002 to 11 directors in 2005.  On average, women comprised 35.8 per cent 
representation on the board.  Furthermore, with the exception of one year (2004), CCS 
consistently achieved more than 30 per cent representation of women among its board 
leaders, thereby making it a suitable case to examine the fourth proposition, which states 
that boards with a critical mass of women will demonstrate responsive governance 
practices.   
The merger between SMS and CCS in June of 2002 resulted in several 
organizational changes, one of which is a decrease in the level of representational 
diversity on the board.  Interestingly, the proportion of female directors on the pre-
merger CCS Board averaged 43.8 per cent, while women averaged only 31.8 per cent of 
directors on the post-merger board.42  Although the board maintained an average level of 
diversity above 30 per cent, the 2002 merger carried large implications for the 
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representation of women on the CCS Board.  In effect, the CCS case is examined in 
view of propositions 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B both before and after the 2002 merger. 
For each case, multiple sources of data were drawn upon to examine the 
theoretical propositions of this study, as described below.   
 
3.4.3 Data Sources and Analytical Framework 
 
The data sources used in this study include personal interviews, archival 
information and organizational documents such as policy manuals, annual reports, and 
organizational websites.  Generally, personal interviews are extremely useful in that they 
provide a focused discussion about the research topic with people who are involved in 
the phenomenon under study.43  Interviews also reveal perceived causal inferences that 
are potentially insightful and useful to the researcher.44  Ethical protocols for conducting 
personal interviews in social sciences are followed, including appropriate procedures to 
ensure informed consent, voluntary participation and participant confidentiality (see 
Appendix A and B).  Participants were informed in writing that they could withdraw 
from the study at any time and could decline to answer any questions asked to them.  A 
semi-structured interview format is chosen and participants were asked to discuss and 
comment on their experience in the director recruitment process and their views 
regarding the issue of diversity, the use of a formal diversity policy, and the board’s 
decision making practices (see Appendix C).  A transcript of each personal interview 
was typed and reviewed by the participant to affirm that the transcript accurately 
reflected what they intended to say (Appendix D).   
Interviewees were selected to include a variety of perspectives and experiences 
on the boards.  Women, men, new and longstanding board members were interviewed.  
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A total of four board members were interviewed, of whom two were women.  In 
addition, two board members belonging to both the SMS Board and the CCS Board were 
interviewed.  The participants provided valuable information about the rules and 
processes of the boards and about their own experiences as directors.   
Interview data, however, can be subject to poor recall, response bias and 
reflexivity.45  Therefore, other sources of information, such as organizational documents 
and archival data, complement information that was acquired throughout the interview 
process.  Policy manuals and current and archived annual reports provide detailed 
information.  Also, the substance and nature of formal board policies are described in 
policy manuals, and major organizational events, issues and priorities are addressed in 
policy manuals, annual reports and member newsletters.  Finally, credit unions inform 
their memberships about key organizational priorities and issues through the distribution 
of annual reports and member newsletters.  These documents cover the timeframe of 
1995 to 2006 and, as a result, provide a broad coverage of past events.46  The 
combination of personal interviews, organizational documents, and archival information 
provide sufficient data needed to develop converging lines of inquiry.47    
The merger between SMS and CCS, and the selection of two participants who 
served on both boards, represent some overlap between the two case studies; however, 
this is a comparative analysis.  Generally, participant recollection and recall in response 
to broad questions is good.  Therefore, this study benefits from the perspectives of these 
participants because they are able to compare both boards, and highlight major 
differences and similarities between SMS and CCS board policies, procedures and 
practices.   
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Three broad analytic strategies are used to analyze case study data.  First, the 
theoretical propositions guide data analysis (see Figure 3.1).  Here, the theoretical 
propositions are used to create a matrix of categories.  Evidence derived from case study 
data sources are placed in the relevant categories.  Yin states that relying on research 
propositions is desirable because “the propositions have shaped your data collection 
plan” and they “[help] to focus attention on certain data and to ignore other data.”48  For 
each case, annual reports, organizational policies and member newsletters are examined 
to determine whether the board used gender neutral or masculine language.  Specifically, 
the terms used for important board positions, such as Board Chair (“Chair,” 
“Chairperson,” “Chairman,” or “Chairwoman”), and the form in which general 
references to directors are made (“he,” “she,” or “he/she”), are identified and 
documented.  This data is placed under the heading “Responsive Governance.” 
An additional category entitled “other influences” is included to address factors 
that are not part of the research propositions, but are identified as potential influences on 
board composition.  As a result, plausible rival explanations can be explored during data 
analysis.  Given the exploratory element of this study, this category also intends to 
include factors that are found to be pertinent to board composition, but were not 
anticipated.  Once placed into categories, evidence is compared to the predicted patterns 
as proposed in the theoretical propositions.  For example, evidence regarding CCS 
recruitment practices is compared to the proposition that diverse boards are likely to 
proactively recruit women.   
The second broad analytic strategy is the development of a chronology of events 
to analyze changes in board diversity and the context surrounding such changes.  Yin 
considers a chronology an effective analytic device.  He states that “you should not think  
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         Figure 3.1 Categorical Data Matrix 
Problem Recognition 
(Recognition of Diversity; Deliberate 
Action) 
Diversity Policy 
Proactive Recruitment Strategy 
(Formal Recruitment Process; Informal 
Recruitment Process) 
Responsive Governance 
(Language Use; Times and Dates of 
Meetings; Decision making Processes; 
Board Services or Policies; Key Board 
Positions) 
Other Influences 
(Board Size; Turnover Rate/Incumbency; Term Limits) 
 
 
of the arraying of events into a chronology as a descriptive device only.  The procedure 
can have an important analytic purpose - to investigate presumed causal events - because 
the basic sequence of a cause and its effect cannot be temporally inverted.”49  The final 
analytical strategy used in this study is a cross-case analysis whereby key differences 
and similarities between the two case studies are revealed and examined to determine the 
key factors that may account for differences in board diversity levels.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This research project aims to answer two questions: how do boards achieve 
diversity; and, how do diverse boards maintain diversity?  Four main themes guide the 
establishment of eight theoretical propositions.  The first theme concerns the area of 
problem recognition.  It is expected that homogenous board will not perceive their lack 
of diversity as problematic, while diverse boards will identify homogeneity as a 
problematic for the governance of their co-operative.  Under the second theme, formal 
diversity policies, it is posited that homogenous will not have a diversity policy, while 
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diverse boards will have a diversity policy to help them achieve representational 
diversity.  In view of the third theme, proactive recruitment strategies, homogenous 
boards are not expected to proactively recruit women to the board, while diverse boards 
are expected to deliberately seek the participation of women in board elections.  The 
final theme is responsive governance.  Here, it is expected that boards without a critical 
mass of diversity will not have responsive governance practices.  On the other hand, 
boards with a critical mass of women are expected to demonstrate responsive 
governance practices.   
This study uses a case study method and a multiple-case study design to test the 
theoretical propositions.  The case studies are selected from a cohort of credit unions that 
were active in the late 1990s and early 2000s and are located in the province of British 
Columbia, specifically the Greater Vancouver Area.  Due to the unavailability of cases 
that demonstrate ethnic diversity, gender diversity is the main focus of this study. 
The SMS board is homogenous, while the CCS board is diverse.  These cases can 
highlight key similarities and differences that may account for different outcomes in 
board composition.  Because SMS and CCS merged in June of 2002, the CCS case is 
examined in view of propositions 1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B in both the pre-merger and post-
merger phases.  In each case, the board’s views and actions towards homogeneity and 
diversity were examined and the presence or absence of a diversity policy, proactive 
recruitment processes, and responsive governance practices was determined.  It was 
predicted that each case would yield different results (see Table 3.1).  Data was collected 
from personal interviews, policy manuals, organizational documents, and archival 
records.  Three broad analytical strategies were used to analyze case study data, 
including the development of a categorical matrix derived from this study’s theoretical  
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    Table 3.1 Predicted Case Study Results 
Key Area of 
Inquiry 
 
Proposition SMS CCS 
1A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of 
their leadership’s representational characteristics 
will not consider their homogeneity, or lack of 
diversity, to be problematic. 
 
Yes - 
Problem 
Recognition 1B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their 
leadership’s representational characteristics will 
consider homogeneity, or lack of diversity, to be 
problematic. 
 
- Yes 
2A:  Boards that are homogenous in terms of 
their leadership’s representational characteristics 
will not have a formal diversity policy. 
 
Yes - 
Formal 
Diversity 
Policy 2B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational characteristics will 
have a formal diversity policy. 
 
- Yes 
3A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of 
their leadership’s representational characteristics 
will not have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
Yes - 
Proactive 
Recruitment 3B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their 
leadership’s representational characteristics will 
have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
- Yes 
4A: Boards that do not have a critical mass of 
women or visible minorities will not 
demonstrate responsive governance practices. 
 
Yes - 
Responsive 
Governance 4B: Boards that have a critical mass of women 
or visible minorities will demonstrate responsive 
governance practices. 
 
- Yes 
 
 
 
propositions, a chronology of events, and a cross-case synthesis of both case studies.  
The following chapter is dedicated to the empirical findings of the two case studies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A CASE STUDY OF SURREY METRO SAVINGS BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical propositions and methodological 
approach of this study were presented.  This chapter considers the findings of the first 
case study, the SMS Board of Directors.  The SMS Board was chosen as a case study 
because it was homogenous in its gender composition.  From 1995 to 2002, only 11.1 
per cent of board members were women and no more than one woman served on the 
Board at any time (see Table 4.1).  Propositions 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A are examined in 
this case study.  To this end, SMS annual reports, newsletter, Credit Union Rules, 
policies, and archival information were reviewed and two former SMS board members 
were interviewed.  As discussed in the previous chapter, case study data was placed in a 
categorical matrix after which empirical evidence was compared with the theoretical 
propositions of this study.  First, the history and structure of the SMS Board is 
described.  The second part of this chapter addresses propositions 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A, 
and presents the findings of the SMS case.  The conclusion considers the extent to which 
the SMS case supports the overarching theory of this thesis. 
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 Table 4.1 SMS Board Composition, by Gender, 1995-2002 
Year Directors 
N 
Women 
(%) 
Women 
N 
Men 
(%) 
Men 
N 
1995 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
1996 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
1997 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
1998 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
1999 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
2000 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
2001 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
2002 9 11.1 1 88.9 8 
 
 Source: SMS Annual Reports. 
 
 
4.2 The Case of Surrey Metro Savings Board of Directors 
 
The focus of this case study is the SMS Board from 1995 to 2002.1  SMS was a 
leading financial institution in the Fraser Valley for over 50 years.  The credit union 
grew, from 41 members in 1947, to become the third largest credit union in Canada with 
over 100,000 members and $2.7 billion dollars in assets in 2001.  In addition to its 
financial success, SMS was also committed to building a strong community.  Through 
its Community Partnership Program, SMS supported numerous community-based 
organizations including hospitals, multicultural groups, schools, social services 
organizations, theatre programs, sports programs, and the United Way.2 
Throughout the 1990s, SMS re-structured its capital share structure and pursued 
various merger opportunities.  In 1992, SMS became the first credit union in Canada to 
list shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE).3  Public shareholders attained non-
voting shares while members retained a significant amount of control over the credit 
union’s affairs.4  In 1999, a proposal to merge with Canada Trust failed to win the 
approval of the membership, provoking the establishment of a task force with a mandate 
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to consult with the membership and determine the future direction of the organization.5  
This task force concluded that the Board and management could only pursue future 
merger opportunities within the credit union system.6  In May, 2002, SMS members 
voted in favour of a merger proposal with CCS.  The merger between SMS and CCS 
was effected on June 27, 2002, thereby creating the second largest credit union in 
Canada with nearly 300,000 members and over $6 billion in assets.7  SMS subsequently 
de-listed its non-voting shares from the TSE.8 
The structure of the SMS Board remained consistent between 1995 and 2002.  It 
had a total of 9 directors, each elected for three-year terms with a term limit provision 
(no board member serves for more than three consecutive terms).9  Each year, three 
board positions were renewed through elections.10  The Board had six standing 
committees comprising of three directors each, including the Executive, Audit, Human 
Resources, Conduct Review, Governance, and Investment and Loan committees.11  
Finally, the Board appointed a Chair, a Senior Vice Chair, and a Vice Chair, which 
together comprised the Executive Committee (see Figure 4.1).12 
 
4.2.1 Problem Recognition 
 
 Proposition 1A of this study is that boards that are homogenous in terms of their 
leadership’s representational characteristics will not consider their homogeneity, or lack 
of diversity, to be problematic.  So, it was predicted that the SMS Board would not 
recognize their homogeneity as a problem.  As such, it was expected that the SMS Board 
would not discuss the issue of diversity at board meetings, or publicly and explicitly 
mention its diversity problem in annual reports or member newsletters. 
From 1995 to 2002, all SMS annual reports referred to the need for diverse 
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Figure 4.1 SMS Organizational Chart, 1995-2002 
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representation on the Board.  As stated in its 1995 Terms of Reference, the Governance 
Committee (also known as the Nominating Committee) was responsible for “annually 
develop[ing] criteria which reflect the needs of the Board in recruiting new candidates to  
ensure the Board is constituted with individuals of diverse background talents and 
experience.”13  Also, according to research participant Robert Field, the issue of 
diversity, including gender diversity, was regularly revisited by the Board: 
[I]t was a constant issue that was discussed.  We wanted the Board to be 
representative of our membership...I definitely know we talked about diversity  
and it was included in our Terms of Reference of the Nominating Committee, 
or at the board level in terms of filling gaps on the Board.14 
   
This suggests that the SMS Board was aware of diversity issues and the need to include 
people with various perspectives in the decision making process.   
However, there are different degrees of awareness about, and commitment to, the 
achievement of board diversity.  As discussed in Chapter Two, organizational 
documents, including policy manuals, annual reports and member newsletters, 
communicate important organizational priorities and issues to the membership.  In the 
case of SMS, the Board did not explicitly recognize gender or ethnic homogeneity as 
problematic, or explicitly bring the issue of board diversity to the membership’s 
attention, in its policy manual, annual reports or member newsletters.  Also, even though 
the Board may have considered gender within its definition of diversity, the idea of 
“diversity” was referred to in a broad and general manner.  The Board did not indicate 
the type or types of diversity with which it was concerned.  
In the end, the level of a board’s commitment to diversity is demonstrated 
through its actions.  Overt and deliberate action towards inclusion indicates that diversity 
is a priority issue for the board.  It also creates an expectation among board members, 
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managers and the membership that the board will address its diversity problem.  A 
clearly stated definition of diversity indicates which types of diversity are important to 
the Board, and communicates such priorities to the membership.  So, although the SMS 
Board may have considered diversity as beneficial for the Board, diversity was not an 
issue for action.   
 
4.2.2 Formal Diversity Policies  
 
As stated in proposition 2A, it is posited that boards that are homogenous in 
terms of their leadership’s representational characteristics will not have a formal 
diversity policy.  As a result, SMS was not expected to have a formal diversity policy 
stating its commitment to equality and equity, and to achieving representational diversity 
on the board. 
In 1992, SMS implemented a Personal Harassment Policy that stated: 
Personal harassment based on race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political 
belief, religion, marital status, physical or mental disability, sex, or age are all 
prohibited under the British Columbia Humans Rights Act. 
Harassment means any unwelcome conduct, comment or gesture, or contact 
based on any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination that could cause 
offence or humiliation to any person, or that might, on reasonable grounds, be 
perceived as placing a condition on employment or any opportunity for training 
or promotion. Some example of harassment include racial slurs, sexist 
comments, and jokes about a person’s age, religion, marital status, sexual 
orientation, ethnic background, or national origin.15 
This policy was important as it prohibited direct discrimination against women and other 
minority group members by SMS managers, co-workers and members.16   
Despite the importance of the Personal Harassment Policy, it is not the same in 
nature or purpose as a formal diversity policy.  A formal diversity policy goes beyond 
protecting individuals from direct discrimination and recognizes that women and visible 
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minorities may face indirect discrimination.  Indirect, or systemic, discrimination is 
when discrimination is not explicit, but when norms or practices have the effect of 
discrimination.17  A formal diversity policy commits an organization to seek 
inclusiveness and acknowledge that, in some circumstances, differential treatment in 
favour of minority group members is required to overcome systemic barriers.   
 
4.2.3 Proactive Recruitment Strategies 
 
Proposition 3A proposes that boards that are homogenous in terms of their 
leadership’s representational diversity will not have proactive recruitment strategies.  In 
effect, it was predicted that the SMS Board did not proactively recruit women and 
visible minorities by deliberately identifying and asking women or visible minorities to 
put their names forward in board elections through formal or informal means. 
Because credit unions are democratic organizations, recruitment strategies are 
intended to shape the pool of candidates from which members choose their 
representatives.  Therefore, a close examination of SMS board candidates may provide 
insight into the impact of recruitment practices on board diversity.  In most SMS Board 
elections, one or no female candidates put their names forward for election (see 
Appendix E).  In 1995 and 1996, no women ran for the Board.  In 1997, 1998 and 2000, 
one female candidate tried for the Board each year. 
The SMS Board employed both formal and informal director recruitment 
practices.  The formal director recruitment strategy was carried out by the Governance 
Committee, which focused on attracting individuals with particular business skills and 
experience.  Its mandate was “to address governance issues, and to identify, recruit and 
nominate, endorse, recommend appointment of, and orient new directors.”18  Dennis 
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Anderson described this formal recruitment process and the Board’s emphasis on merit 
in the evaluation of potential board candidates:  
[I]t was basically a call for nominations.  We would generally ask for people 
that had the right kind of skills and experience [that] would add value to the 
Board...Then it was up to the individuals to come forward.  We had a 
Nominating Committee who would conduct the interviews.  We would either 
endorse or not endorse the people depending on whether they met our 
criteria.19 
 
Each year, the Governance Committee conducted a gap analysis whereby it identified 
specific business skills and experiences that it believed the Board was missing but that 
were required.20  Every credit union member received a Call for Nominations outlining 
the skills and experience identified in the gap analysis.  Potential candidates were 
expected to self-identify and attend a structured interview.  Then, the Governance 
Committee endorsed those candidates that met its criteria.21  Throughout the formal 
recruitment process, the Governance Committee did not explicitly call for women to 
come forward. 
Candidates were also recruited through informal means.  Board members and 
managers were encouraged to identify potential directors from among the broader 
membership.22  One research participant explained that “We would also use our 
knowledge of people in the membership.  We would ask branch managers to help 
identify people that they thought could be strong contenders for board membership.”23  
When asked whether the Board considered diversity or discussed the issue of diversity, 
interview participants responded differently.  According to Robert Filed, the Board 
attempted to recruit people with board experience as well as women and visible 
minorities.  He stated:  
SMS took a more aggressive approach [than other credit unions] in regards to 
recruiting candidates that had board experience...We consciously worked on 
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trying to establish diversity.  It was certainly one of the words used in the 
things we wanted to include.  Our area at SMS had a large Indo-Canadian 
population and we made efforts to recruit board members from that 
community.  We certainly made efforts to recruit women to the Board as well.  
Part of that was driven by the fact that we were a publicly traded company.  
That put a different level of governance on SMS because we were bound by the 
TSX governance rules, which were far more stringent than what is required 
under credit union governance.24   
 
When asked if specific strategies were in place to recruit women and visible minorities, 
or whether diversity was a conscious part of the endorsation process, he responded: 
[W]e always had an active list of candidates.  We would be constantly 
recruiting candidates and keep them on a list.  If you couldn’t make it this year, 
you would be on the list for next year...We wrote in our guidelines diversity.  
We also considered gender within the definition of diversity...My personal 
philosophy [was] that when we felt we should have greater representation from 
the East Indian community, or additional women on the Board, if two 
candidates were relatively equal, I would suggest that we recommend and 
endorse the woman.25 
 
Dennis Anderson, however, did not recall the board overtly focusing on diversity during 
the informal recruitment process.  When asked whether the issue of diversity came up, 
he responded that it “probably did indirectly.  I know we had one lady on the Board and 
when she decided to step aside we went out of our way to get her to try and run for 
another term because she did add a lot of value to the Board.”26   
Two comments may be made regarding the different interpretations and 
recollections of the interview participants.  First, not all board members consciously 
addressed diversity during the recruitment process.  Efforts toward increasing diversity 
on the Board were the result of personal convictions as opposed to a collective effort by 
all directors.  Second, both participants considered one’s gender or ethnic background 
once candidates had already demonstrated that they met the criteria outlined by the 
Governance Committee, or had already proved themselves to be capable directors.  In 
other words, the Board or individual directors did not seek out diversity per se.  
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Although encouragement to, and endorsement of, women and visible minorities is 
beneficial at any stage of the recruitment process, proactive recruitment requires that 
minority group members are identified as necessary but under represented constituents at 
the outset of the recruitment effort.  As well, one’s gender and ethnic background can 
not be incidentally considered; it must be included as a primary criterion with which 
candidates are recruited, evaluated, and endorsed.  Therefore, the SMS board did not 
have a proactive recruitment strategy specifically aimed at increasing the number of 
women and visible minority directors.  
 
4.2.4 Responsive Governance 
 
Proposition 4A states that boards that do not have a critical mass of women or 
visible minorities will not demonstrate responsive governance practices.  From 1995 to 
2002, the SMS Board did not exceed 11.1 per cent representation by women.  Because 
there were few women who served on the Board, it was expected that the SMS Board 
would use masculine language in organizational documents, have pre-determined dates 
and times for board meetings, and not have specific policies aimed to facilitate the 
participation of those with non-traditional work, familial, or cultural commitments.  As 
well, it was expected that women who served on the board would not occupy influential 
board positions. 
SMS governance practices did not necessarily exclude women from decision 
making processes.  Some board practices revealed that SMS was flexible and adaptable 
to different circumstances and lifestyles.  For example, interview participants revealed 
that the dates and times of board meetings were flexible and determined by means of 
consensus.27  The SMS Board met between 6 and 7 times each year.28  Dennis Anderson 
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noted that, because most board members worked during the day, meetings were typically 
held in the evenings:   
Because everybody was working, we tried to accommodate schedules so that 
the meetings were held in the evenings, after the work day.  So the meeting 
would start around 6pm in the evening on a weekday.  Then we would have a 
planning session that would go a Friday and a Saturday.  We threw the 
Saturday in there so it didn’t disrupt the work schedules [of board members].29 
 
Robert Field emphasized the flexibility of committee meeting dates and times and the 
willingness of directors to accommodate different circumstances: 
[A]ll our meetings other than regular board meetings [were] very flexible.  We 
[met] at 7 in the morning by telephone conference or whatever.  I wouldn’t say 
that it was overtly done.  We never had a childcare policy or anything...[b]ut 
we certainly [adjusted] schedules and meetings in order to accommodate 
people.30 
 
Even though it was not purposely done, this practice ensured that those with different 
work, family or cultural commitments than those who have traditionally served on 
boards potentially could participate in meetings.   
However, other SMS governance practices indicate that SMS did not deliberately 
attempt to facilitate the participation of women on the Board.  As stated above, the 
Board did not implement policies designed to accommodate differences in the traditional 
gender roles between men and women, such as childcare provision.  In addition, the use 
of gender neutral language in SMS annual reports used to describe board positions and 
directors was inconsistent.  In some cases, annual reports and pamphlets referred to the 
position of Board Chair in masculine form.  For example, in its “Statement of Corporate 
Governance Practices,” the 1999 SMS Annual Report stated: 
Each committee is comprised of three directors and the Chair serves as ex-
officio on those committees to which he/she has not otherwise been elected or 
appointed...Surrey Metro Savings has a Chairman separate from management, 
and the Board functions independently of management.  The Chairman’s role 
is to ensure that full and effective reporting and communication is established 
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between the CEO and the Board of Directors...The Chairman is also either a 
member of all Board committees, or an ex-officio member.31 
 
Another example of masculine language is found in a Board of Directors pamphlet that 
introduced the 2000 SMS Board and explained some basic governance practices: “A 
Director cannot serve more than five years as Chairman.”32  Although the use of 
masculine language or the absence of gender sensitive board policies may not deter 
women from participating, responsive governance policies and gender neutral language 
send an important message to potential directors that the board is willing to 
accommodate many lifestyles and is conscious about gender issues.  
Lastly, and most significantly, the SMS committee structure reduced the 
opportunities for women to influence the policy-making process.  It was not possible to 
acquire the views of female SMS board members: only two women served on the SMS 
Board from 1995 to 2002 and they were not able to participate in this study.33  
Nonetheless, even if it is assumed that the views of women were respected and 
appreciated, few women served on the Board, none of which served as Chair, Senior 
Vice Chair, or Vice Chair (see Table 4.2).  As a result, no women served on the 
Executive Committee, a key decision making body.  The significance of the Executive 
Committee is illustrated in SMS annual reports, which states that the Executive 
Committee “acts as a sounding board for the CEO on matters requiring Boards 
involvement.  This committee also acts in emergency circumstances as required between 
meetings of the full Board of Directors, and is responsible for representing the company 
in certain credit union system and public relations matters.”34  Further, the Executive 
Committee structure made it difficult for all board members to fully participate in the 
policy-making process.  When asked whether all board members were given a fair 
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Table 4.2 SMS Executive Committee, 1995-2001 
Year Chair Senior Vice Chair Vice Chair 
1995 Tom Kirstein H.A. (Bert) Miles Dale Mumford 
1996 H.A. (Bert) Miles Dale Mumford Bruce H. Chapman 
1997 H.A. (Bert) Miles Bruce H. Chapman Frank L. Harper 
1998 H.A. (Bert) Miles Bruce H. Chapman Frank L. Harper 
1999 Bruce H. Chapman Frank L. Harper Tom Kirstein 
2000 Bruce H. Chapman Frank L. Harper Tom Kirstein 
2001 Tom Kirstein Frank L. Harper Douglas T. Stone 
 
Source: SMS Annual Reports. 
 
 
 
chance to influence the policy-making process, Robert Field responded: 
I would say SMS was a much more autocratic board than our current board.  
We [the SMS Board] had an Executive Committee...The Executive Committee 
would always meet about major issues and stuff would be vetted with the 
Executive Committee before the Board met…All board members need to be 
there to be part of the decision making process.  They were always part of the 
process, but the major decisions had already been made by the Executive 
Committee about the major issues before it came to the Board for ratification.  
So you felt like ‘what…am I doing here?”35  
 
This suggests that those board members who were not on the Executive Committee were 
significantly less influential in the policy-making process.  The Executive Committee 
approach, combined with the low number of female directors and their absence in key 
board positions, significantly reduced the likelihood that women’s perspectives 
influenced key board decisions.  
 
4.3 Summary 
 
In sum, the case of the SMS Board of Directors supports the theoretical 
propositions of this study.  Because the SMS Board of Directors was homogenous in 
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nature, it was predicted that it would not have identified homogeneity as problematic, 
employed a diversity policy, proactively recruited women, or demonstrated responsive 
governance practices.  First, the reference to diversity in the Governance Committee’s 
Terms of Reference and participant testimony suggest that the SMS Board was aware of 
diversity issues.  However, the SMS case demonstrates that there are different levels of 
awareness about diversity issues.  Even though SMS stated the importance of board 
diversity in its annual reports, it did not explicitly define the term diversity, publicly 
address the issue of board homogeneity, or demonstrate that board diversity was a 
priority issue for the Board.   
Second, although SMS had a Personal Harassment Policy, it did not have a 
diversity policy which expressly emphasized the need to include under represented 
groups, such as women and visible minorities on the Board.  Third, the Board did not 
proactively recruit women and visible minorities.  Some board members may have 
considered the issue of diversity tangentially in the recruitment process, but formal and 
informal recruitment processes were primarily focused on recruiting candidates with 
previous board experience and particular business skills.  Finally, the inconsistent use of 
gender neutral language and the absence of gender sensitive policies indicate that the 
Board did not consciously address the needs and identities of minority group members.  
Finally, the SMS Executive Committee approach, the low number of female board 
members, and the absence of women in influential board positions made it difficult to 
ensure women’s perspectives were included in key board decisions.  In the end, support 
for propositions 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A appear in this case. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A CASE STUDY OF COAST CAPITAL SAVINGS BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the findings of the second case study are presented.  The CCS 
Board of Directors was selected for this study because it was a gender diverse board:  
from 2001 to 2006, the CCS Board achieved an average of 35.8 per cent women’s 
representation (see Table 5.1).1   However, the CCS case is treated in two separate 
periods.  The first period is the pre-merger phase, which covers the 2001 and 2002 CCS 
boards.  During this period, women comprised an average of 43.8 per cent of board 
directors.  The second period, or post-merger phase, covers the CCS Board from 2003 to 
2006.  Here, women’s representation on the CCS Board averaged 31.8 per cent, 
indicating a marked decrease in representational diversity.  Still, in both periods, the 
CCS Board averaged over 30 per cent female representation and, therefore, propositions 
1B, 2B, 3B, and 4B are examined in both the pre-merger and post-merger periods.  
Therefore, it was expected that the findings of the CCS case study would yield 
contrasting results to those of the SMS case study.   
CCS annual reports, newsletters, Credit Union Rules, policies and archival 
information were examined.  Also, four CCS board members were interviewed, 
including two women and two men (the male participants also served on the SMS 
Board).  As in the previous chapter, the case study analysis was guided by the theoretical   
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      Table 5.1 CCS Board Composition, by Gender, 2001-2006 
Period Year Directors N 
Women 
(%) 
Women 
N 
Men 
(%) 
Men 
N 
2001 16 43.8 7 56.2 8 Pre-
merger 2002 16 43.8 7 56.2 8 
Transition 
Board 2002(b)* 18 33.3 6 66.7 12 
2003 16 31.3 5 68.7 11 
2004** 13 23.1 3 76.9 10 
2005 11 36.4 4 65.6 7 
Post-
merger 
2006 11 36.4 4 65.6 7 
  
    Source: CCS Annual Reports. 
*The 2002(b) Board of Directors refers to the CCS Board immediately after the 
merger with SMS, and constitutes a transition board.  This Board was not directly 
elected by the CCS membership and consisted of 12 CCS directors 6 SMS directors.  
The 2002(b) Board governed from June, 2002 to the 2003 director elections. 
**In March 2004, one Board member passed away, leaving a total of 12 directors 
until the next election. The Board planned to decrease its size to 12 directors in 2005.  
This position was not subsequently filled and, therefore, the number of directors 
decreased to 11. 
 
 
 
propositions and case study data was placed in a categorical matrix.  Also, a chronology 
of CCS Board events was developed to provide insight into changes in board 
composition.  First, the history and structure of the CCS Board is described.  Next, the 
findings of the CCS case regarding proposition 1B through 4B in both the pre- and post-
merger periods are presented.  To conclude, the extent to which the CCS case supports 
the overarching theory of this study is examined. 
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 5.2 The Case of Coast Capital Savings Board of Directors 
 
The second case study focuses on the CCS Board of Directors from 2001 to 2006, 
with particular attention to the pre-merger (2001-2002) and post-merger (2003-2006) 
periods.  CCS was created when Richmond Savings Credit Union and Pacific Coast 
Savings Credit Union merged on December 31, 2000, and constitutes the beginning of 
the pre-merger period.  Richmond Savings Credit Union served communities in the 
Lower Mainland region, while Pacific Coast Savings Credit Union served communities 
on Vancouver Island.  In June of 2002, CCS merged with SMS, and denotes the 
beginning of the post-merger phase.  This merger added the Fraser Valley as a core 
service area.  Despite the challenge of integrating three separate organizations, CCS has 
enjoyed much success and recognition, which can be largely attributed to its innovative 
approach to financial services and its strong commitment to the community.  By 2006, 
CCS had approximately 340,000 members, $8.2 billion dollars in assets, and 47 
branches across the Fraser Valley, the Lower Mainland, and Vancouver Island.2  It was 
the first financial services organization in Canada to introduce free chequing accounts 
for its members.  CCS also received several awards for its management practices, 
commitment to community and ethical business practices, such as the Ethics in Action 
Overall Leadership Award, one of Canada’s 50 Best Managed Companies, and the 
Imagine Corporate Citizenship Award, to name only a few.3   
The structure of the pre-merger CCS Board remained consistent throughout 2001 
and up until June of 2002.  During this time, the Board had a total of 16 directors who 
served three-year terms.4  There was no restriction on the number of terms a director 
could serve.5  The pre-merger CCS Board had 7 committees including the Executive, 
Human Resources, Finance and Audit, Conduct Review, Governance and Member 
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 Relations, Nominations and Election, and Investment and Loan committees.6  As well, 
the Board Chair, 1st Vice Chair, 2nd Vice Chair and one other director made up the 
Executive Committee.7  
In contrast, the post-merger CCS Board underwent several changes between 2003 
and 2006.  The size of the Board ranged from 16 directors in 2003 to 11 directors in 
2006.8  As in the pre-merger period, board members served three-year terms, and had no 
restriction on the number of terms they could serve.9  The Board had 7 standing 
committees (Executive, Human Resources, Finance and Audit, Conduct Review, 
Governance and Member Relations, Nominations and Election, and Investment and 
Loan) in 2003; however, this number was reduced to six after the abolition of the 
Executive Committee in 2004 (see Figure 5.1).10 
 
5.2.1 Problem Recognition 
 
Proposition 1B states that boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s 
representational characteristics will consider homogeneity, or lack of diversity, to be 
problematic.  As such, the CCS Board was expected to discuss the issue of diversity at 
board meetings as well as in annual reports and member newsletters.  This proposition is 
examined in both the pre-merger and post-merger periods.   
As stated above, CCS achieved an average of 43.8 per cent female representation 
during the pre-merger period.  In the post-merger phase, women comprised 31.8 per cent 
of total directors.  A transition board governed immediately after the merger in June of 
2002 until the 2003 director elections.  The transition board was not elected: four CCS 
directors stepped down and 6 SMS directors joined the new board, after which the 
number of female directors decreased by 1.11  In the post-merger phase, 
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 Figure 5.1 CCS Organizational Chart, 2001-2006 
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 the proportion of female board members decreased to 33.3 per cent in 2003 and reached 
its lowest point in 2004 with only 23.1 per cent.  Nevertheless, the number of women on 
the CCS Board increased in the following director elections.  In 2005 and 2006, both 
board elections resulted in 36.4 per cent women’s representation with 4 of 11 directors 
being women.   
In the pre-merger phase, there were no references to representational diversity in 
annual reports or member newsletters.  In the post-merger phase, however, the topic of 
diversity was mentioned in CCS annual reports and member newsletters.  For example, 
the 2004 AGM and Board Elections Notice stated: “It is critical that the composition of 
the Board reflects the membership and be balanced in terms of skills, experience and 
knowledge in order that it meet its responsibilities and maximizes its effectiveness.”12  
Like the SMS case, however, the term “diversity” was referred in a general and broad 
manner and was not specifically defined.   
Also, board members had different interpretations about the Board’s approach to 
gender and ethnic diversity.  One participant explained that the board believed diversity 
to be beneficial, but that the most important director attributes were one’s business skills 
and experience: 
[W]e would like to have a broad diversity of people on our board including 
females and certain ethnic groups.  We are making a concerted effort to market 
to the Chinese community and it would be good to possibly have one of their 
members, being either female or male, on the Board.  And because we are 
expanding geographically, we also look at if a person has the right skills and 
experience say in Chilliwack...hopefully we could find a person from that 
market whom we would endorse.  We don’t care whether they are male, 
female, [or] what ethnic background they have, as long as they have the right 
business skills and experience.13  
    
Another participant also emphasized the Board’s strong emphasis on specific merit 
criteria: 
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 The focus right now is on skill set – the gap analysis.  I feel that our board is 
fairly diverse in that regard.  More important at this point is the skill set that [a] 
person can bring to the Board.  I would never recommend to the membership 
somebody not as skilled because they fulfilled a criterion that represented 
diversity because we are responsible for people’s money, and large sums of 
it.14 
 
One director who joined the Board in 2005 recalled the issue of ethnic diversity being 
discussed by the Board:  
[W]e are not an ethnically diverse board at all...yet our customer base is quite 
ethnically diverse...It was a concern and a problem.  It was raised and brought 
forward for the Nominations Committee to think about how we could 
encourage more ethnically diverse people to run for the Board and how they 
could be elected.15 
 
On the other hand, one participant who served on both the pre-merger and post-
merger boards revealed an alternative perspective regarding the Board’s attitude towards 
representational diversity.  She stated: 
I have been arguing for more diversity.  My pitch when I was interviewed as a 
candidate was that I would add diversity to the Board.  I have mentioned it 
because we are trying to attract Chinese members.  I mentioned it more than 
once that might be helpful if we had either a Chinese director or at least a 
visible minority director on the Board.  But there is a lot of the attitude that 
they are afraid that if you get somebody, they think that they are just going to 
represent those members and not work for the Board as a whole... 
 
[There is] a lot of resistance [to the idea of diversity].  [T]he thing that 
happened – and I think it is mostly post-Enron – is that there has been a sudden 
upsurge in the interest in governance...So they have developed all these rules 
for improving board governance.  A lot of it is that you have to have the right 
skills and the right fit.16 
 
Although the Board discussed the issue of diversity, whether it was an important issue to 
the Board, and whether the issue was adequately addressed, was interpreted differently 
by the participants.   
Nevertheless, the issue of female representation was explicitly addressed during 
post-merger period in the 2004 CCS Annual Report (released in the spring of 2005).  As 
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 discussed above, the Board reached its lowest point of female representation after the 
2004 director elections.  Prior to the 2005 director elections, CCS launched a seven-
month public awareness campaign entitled “Leading the Way” which intended to 
educate members about governance issues and the director recruitment process.17  The 
2004 CCS Annual Report included a section devoted to this campaign.  In the 
“Frequently Asked Questions” section, CCS was asked how it was improving the 
director recruitment process.  It responded: 
In 2004, based on member feedback, Coast Capital Savings reviewed and 
strengthened its recruitment process to provide our membership with a diverse 
group of qualified election candidates.  We strongly believe Board composition 
needs to reflect Coast Capital Savings’ membership base and be balanced in 
terms of skill, experience, and knowledge, in order to maximize its 
effectiveness. 
 
Historically, the credit union had a cross-section of qualified male and female 
candidates, but in the past few years, we have had fewer women stand for 
election. Currently, Coast Capital Savings’ Board of Directors is comprised of 
three females and 10 males. On average, women represent approximately 10% 
of Canadian Boards. Although our female representation on the Board is much 
higher (23%) than the national average, we know we can do better.  
 
To help raise awareness of the importance of diversity on our Board and to 
recruit skilled and knowledgeable candidates for election to the Board of 
Directors, the credit union undertook a public campaign on behalf of the 
Nominations and Elections Committee.  A brochure was developed to improve 
understanding of the Board’s role and the candidate recruitment process, and 
several articles were published in the member newsletter to increase the 
number of qualified candidates standing for election.18 
 
Ultimately, the Board responded to the drop in gender diversity by explicitly 
acknowledging the decrease in women’s representation.  The Board also stated its 
intentions to address governance issues, including the issue of gender diversity, with an 
awareness campaign regarding the director recruitment process.  In 2005 and 2006, 
women’s representation increased to 36.4 per cent.  The 2005 and 2006 annual reports 
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 did not mention the issue of gender diversity, suggesting that the issue of gender 
homogeneity was no longer problematic for the Board.   
In summary, support for proposition 1B was not found in the pre-merger period, 
but was found in the post-merger period.  While women’s representation reached its 
highest point in the pre-merger period with 43.8 per cent, representational diversity was 
not a priority issue for the Board during the pre-merger period.  Yet, the Board explicitly 
and publicly responded to the decrease of women’s representation in the post-merger 
period and made the issue of diversity an action issue for the Board.  Together, these 
findings suggest that, although the issue of diversity was not problematic for the Board 
in the pre-merger period, this high level of achievement in women’s representation made 
it unlikely that the CCS Board would accept a significant decrease in gender diversity.  
These findings also suggest that the lack of discussion about diversity in the pre-merger 
phase was most likely a result of the Board’s satisfaction with its diversity levels, as 
opposed to a lack of awareness about diversity issues. 
 
5.2.2 Formal Diversity Policies 
 
Proposition 2B posits that boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s 
representational characteristics will have a formal diversity policy.  So, it was expected 
that the CCS Board would have a formal diversity policy stating its commitment to 
ensure the representation of women.   
In fact, the CCS board did not have a gender or ethnic diversity policy in either the 
pre-merger or post-merger period.  Some research participants noted their opposition to 
affirmative action policies. One participant stated: 
We are basically saying that if I had a situation of two equal people with equal 
skill set, I would recommend endorsing the person from the Asian 
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 community...It just makes for a better board.  But I would never sacrifice the 
strength of the Board just to meet a diversity policy. I don’t think the 
shareholders of the credit union...would want us to do that.19   
 
Another participant noted: “It doesn’t matter who is on the Board, but they really have to 
have the right skills and experience.”20  So, some participants were fearful that a formal 
diversity policy could compromise the quality of the Board.   
 Although the CCS Board did not have a formal diversity policy in terms of 
women’s representation on the Board, it had a formal regional diversity policy.  This 
policy ensured that the key geographic communities served by CCS were represented 
among the credit union’s elected leadership.  As demonstrated below, the CCS regional 
diversity policy was strongly supported by both the membership and the Board.  This 
policy was in effect throughout the pre-merger and post-merger periods. 
 The CCS regional diversity policy underwent several small changes between 
2001 and 2006.  However, its overall objective remained consistent: to secure equitable 
regional representation among the credit union’s elected leadership.  In the pre-merger 
period, the policy required that the Board comprised of 8 directors from the Mainland 
and 8 directors from Vancouver Island that were elected by their respective 
communities.21  In the fall of 2002, members passed a Special Resolution allowing the 
Board to use its own discretion regarding regional representation.22  As well, a plebiscite 
asking members about their preference between regional and at large representation 
affirmed the membership’s desire for regional representation.23  Before the 2003 director 
elections, the Board passed a policy “that all members will vote for all directors, and that 
the Board will consist of a minimum of eight directors residing on the Mainland and four 
directors residing on the Island, in respect of the proportion of members on the Island 
and Mainland (one-third and two-thirds respectively).”24  The candidate (or candidates) 
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 from a particular region with the highest number of votes would fill the vacant board 
position designated for that region.25  This policy applied to all subsequent elections.26   
Furthermore, one participant explained why regional representation was important 
for the CCS Board, as well as for future boards:   
I’ll talk...about geographic diversity...Once we get the ability to move outside 
of our marketplace...[s]ay we go into Alberta or Ontario...it would be good to 
have a board member who really understood the socio-economics of the 
province – someone who understood what the drivers were and understood the 
needs that are in that province from a financial perspective.27  
 
While the CCS regional diversity policy does not address the issue of gender or visible 
minority board representation, it is significant in that it guarantees a minimal degree of 
representational diversity in the democratically elected leadership of CCS.  
So, despite the fact the CCS had a formal regional diversity policy, it did not have 
formal diversity policy regarding the representation of women on the Board.  Therefore, 
proposition 2B of this thesis was not supported by the CCS case the pre-merger or post-
merger period. 
 
5.2.3 Proactive Recruitment 
 
Proposition 3B states that boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s 
representational characteristics will have proactive recruitment strategies.  In effect, it 
was predicted that CCS proactively recruited women to the Board by overtly and 
publicly calling for women to run for the board, as well as actively seeking and 
identifying potential female candidates through informal networks and personal 
encouragement.   
As regards CCS recruitment practices, there are significant differences between the 
pre-merger and post-merger periods.  First, during the pre-merger phase, CCS did not 
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 have a specific recruitment strategy.  In 2001, CCS had the highest number of total 
female candidates vying for the Board, with 7 out of 16 board candidates being women 
(see Appendix F).  Although the total number of candidates dropped to 10 the following 
year, women continued to comprise 40 per cent of all board candidates.  According to 
research participants, the CCS recruitment process in 2001 and 2002 was less structured 
than the recruitment practices of the merger partner (SMS).  One participant who served 
on the CCS Board before it merged with SMS stated: 
There wasn’t this whole elaborate procedure then.  There was no interview [for 
CCS]…I think if you were really felt to be unsuitable they might have said 
something…It has been getting more and more controlled [since the merger].28  
 
Also, one interviewee who served on the SMS Board commented that the CCS Board 
did not have a very structured recruitment process: 
SMS had greater diligence in its recruiting process.  The others didn’t conduct 
interviews and they just appointed the same people.  Often it was a quasi-
political appointment…Some people were just elected because they had been 
nominated at the AGM out of the crowd and had been on the board forever.  It 
was not a real aggressive campaign.29 
 
In 2001 and 2002, the Nominations and Election Committee released a Call for 
Nominations in the fall indicating the number of board vacancies and the deadline to 
submit candidate nominations.30  It did not explain the recruitment process in annual 
reports or identify and articulate specific characteristics and attributes of ideal 
candidates, such as gender, ethnic background, skills, or experience.   
In the post-merger phase, CCS implemented new candidate recruitment practices 
and procedures.  A total of 9 individuals came forward for the 2003 election, of which 
33.3 per cent were female.  As in the previous year, nine candidates vied for the Board 
in 2004; however, no women put their name forward for election.   
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 In 2003, the CCS Board introduced a new recruitment strategy which emphasized 
merit and aimed at attracting candidates with particular business skills and experience.  
Some participants noted the corporate scandals of the 1990s as constituting the key 
impetus for the Board’s focus on business skills and experience.  As one participant 
explained: 
[T]he litigation aspect surrounding corporate governance has gone up at least 
ten fold [since corporate scandals in the United States]…So you really up the 
ante for the responsibilities of a board. We have over the last few years 
recognized this fact at CCS.  We started trying to get more experienced board 
members even before Sarbanes Oxley because we recognized that the 
complexities and competitiveness of the business is getting more onerous…So 
we said, ‘O.K., if a person is going to sit on our board, they really have to add 
value.’  And the only way you can really add value is if you understand the 
business and the risks associated with it extremely well, or you have the right 
types of business skills and experience so that you can get up to speed very 
quickly.31 
 
With this in mind, the CCS Board adopted several formal recruitment practices 
previously employed by the SMS Board, including a gap analysis of the Board’s 
business skills and experience, a structured candidate interview and the endorsation of 
those candidates that met the criteria outlined in the gap analysis. 
The Nominations and Election Committee was responsible for the implementation 
of the recruitment process.  It conducted a gap analysis of the Board, identified and 
recruited qualified candidates, interviewed candidates, and publicly endorsed those 
whom it believed would add strength to the Board. 32  Throughout the recruitment 
process, the importance of business skills and experience was continuously emphasized.  
For example, the 2006 Director Election Package included the following statement:  
For the 2006 election, based on the analysis done by the Nominations and 
Election Committee, ideal candidates would have: Experience in a highly 
competitive multi-location retail business environment; The ability to develop 
strategies around corporate branding, product development, and investment 
service; Knowledge of how corporate social responsibility policies can have a 
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 positive impact on the communities served and beyond; Skills to comprehend 
financial statements and management reports; Strong leadership, team building 
and communication skills; Related board experience and insight into good 
corporate governance practices; Legal, real estate and/or mediation 
experience.33 
 
Throughout the formal recruitment process, women were not proactively recruited.  
Gender was not mentioned in the ideal candidate description and women were not 
explicitly encouraged to come forward.   
As discussed above, the Board attempted to increase member awareness about 
governance issues, in part because of a significant decrease in level of gender diversity 
in 2003 and 2004.  Seven months before the 2005 director elections, the Board launched 
the “Leading the Way” public awareness campaign.  Before the 2006 director elections, 
the Board did not undertake another awareness campaign, although one board member 
noted the Board’s ongoing effort to provide members with information regarding 
governance issues.  For instance, when asked whether the board had specific strategies 
in place to increase diversity, one participant who served on the 2004 Nominations and 
Election Committee responded: 
No. It was along the lines of, ‘here is what we are looking for and if you have 
the skills to help us with that and move our board forward then demonstrate to 
us how you could be a good board member.’ But we didn’t specifically say 
‘emphasis will be placed on a certain ethnic background or certain gender.’...It 
[is] sort of like if I am a company and I am recruiting for the position of 
Marketing and Human resources, you don’t say, ‘a female would be preferred’ 
because that would scare a lot of people away that may have the right skills... 
 
We are trying to get this ‘keep it in your face’ all the time, that being the 
importance of building this board and trying to let people know more about 
what the role of a director encompasses.34 
 
The underlying assumption of the awareness campaign and the Board’s efforts to 
provide members with a lot of information was that the Board’s open and transparent 
process would increase the number of qualified individuals, and therefore the number of 
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 women, trying for positions on the Board.  Interestingly, in the 2005 board election, the 
total number of board candidates surpassed 2002 levels with 13 candidates trying for the 
Board, 4 of which were women.  Prior to the 2006 election, there was no organized 
awareness campaign and only one woman came forward for election.  The increase in 
female board candidates in the 2005 director elections, and the subsequent decrease in 
the 2006 director elections, suggest that the public awareness campaign was successful 
in attracting more female board candidates. 
As well, the experiences of directors help us understand how the formal and 
informal CCS recruitment processes likely influenced the number of female candidates 
trying for the Board.  The views of research participants about whether diversity was 
considered throughout the recruitment process differed.  Two participants noted that 
candidates were judged strictly on the basis of merit, regardless of gender.  When asked 
whether the Nominations and Election Committee considered diversity, one research 
participant responded: 
I don’t think so, because I have been arguing for more diversity…They see it 
when it is business related, but [not] when it’s other forms of diversity.  The 
only criterion is business experience or MBAs and that kind of thing.35 
 
Another participant felt that the Board considered diversity by not discriminating against 
women in the recruitment process: 
When we go through determining who we are going to endorse or not endorse, 
we do take into consideration diversity.  Say we had two people from 
Chilliwack, one was a lady and one was a man, and they both had equal skills – 
and skills that we were looking for – we would certainly endorse both of them.  
So there is no bias against gender and ethnicity.  We are totally open.  If you 
have the right skills and experience, we’ll endorse you.36 
 
Both statements suggest that the Board did not place special emphasis on gender or 
ethnic background throughout the recruitment process.   
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 Participants also noted that board members and branch managers watched for 
potential candidates.37  As one participant explained: “What I am doing now...[is] I am 
putting the word out that ‘let me know if you know someone you think would be a good 
board member.”38  Although it is difficult to know whether board members or branch 
managers took diversity into account when recruiting candidates, the experience of one 
female director suggests that some people considered diversity when approaching 
certain individuals.  Her experience also indicates that openness, transparency, and 
clarity about the roles and responsibilities of directors play and important role in 
recruitment efforts.  Elected in 2005, Christine Hansen described her experience in the 
recruitment process:  
I had been a member of [credit union name].  I had gotten to know the  
branch manager fairly well throughout the years…The manager of my branch 
knew about how I was involved in the community, the business community 
and the not-for-profit sector.  He put my name forward and contacted me and 
linked me up with the people that were doing the recruiting for potential board 
members. He convinced me to go to the meeting that they had for potential 
board members.  From that, when I heard what was involved and what the 
board did, I felt that my experience and involvement in the community could 
benefit the Board.  So I stood to run... 
 
There was a mandatory meeting that all potential candidates had to go to, 
where the information about what was involved in the board, your time 
commitments, your liability and responsibility commitments, and particularly, 
the types of skills and abilities that they were recruiting for were very well laid 
out...It was very informative and very well-done.  From that, we were invited 
to book ourselves for a panel interview with the Nominations Committee if we 
felt we still wanted to proceed...I did feel I still wanted to proceed at that stage.  
I hadn’t heard anything that would preclude me from running as a candidate.39 
 
When asked whether gender or ethnic background came up in the nominations process, 
she responded: 
No. In my experience I didn’t feel that was a factor…Although I have to admit 
that my branch manager, who approached me more as a friend at that stage, 
said ‘I think it would be nice to have more strong women on the Board.’40 
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 Her experience is particularly significant given the fact she was one of four women 
elected to the Board in 2005, and the only non-incumbent woman elected to the Board.  
In the end, her participation on the Board made an important contribution to the overall 
increase in women’s representation to 36.4 per cent in 2005 from 23.1 per cent in the 
previous year. 
To summarize, in the pre-merger phase, the recruitment process was largely 
unstructured and consisted of a basic Call for Nominations.  The post-merger period saw 
the introduction of a formal and highly structured recruitment process.  Many SMS 
recruitment practices were introduced, such as the gap analysis and the endorsation 
process.  In 2004, CCS launched the “Leading the Way” public awareness campaign 
intended to educate members about governance issues and the director recruitment 
process with hopes to increase the number of qualified candidates trying for the Board.  
Throughout both pre-merger and post-merger periods, women were not proactively 
recruited through formal means.  They were not explicitly asked or encouraged to put 
their names forward for election.  Also, participants indicated that there was no 
collective effort on behalf of the Board to specifically recruit female candidates.  
However, the experience of one female director demonstrates the importance of personal 
encouragement and highlights the need for a proactive approach in recruiting new 
candidates.  It also underscores the importance of providing potential candidates with 
adequate information about board processes.  So, proposition 3B is not supported by the 
CCS case. 
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 5.2.4 Responsive Governance 
 
Proposition 4B states that boards that have critical mass of women or visible 
minorities will demonstrate responsive governance practices.  Therefore, it was expected 
that the CCS Board would display responsive governance practices, including the use of 
gender neutral language in organizational documents, flexible meeting dates and times, 
gender sensitive board policies, as well as the presence of women in influential board 
positions.   
During both the pre-merger and post-merger periods, the CCS Board did not have 
gender sensitive policies that were specifically aimed at facilitating the participation of 
women.41  One participant noted that the Board did not require such policies: “we don’t 
offer babysitting services or stuff like that because we don’t have the need to.”42  
Because current and past board members did not require, or ask for, such services, the 
Board did not perceive a need to have policies designed to facilitate the participation of 
women.  However, gender sensitive board policies are important in that they signal to 
women that the Board is willing to address their potential needs.  In turn, women may be 
more inclined to run for the Board.  So, by preemptively implementing gender sensitive 
policies, the Board may attract new board candidates who would find such policies 
beneficial.   
In several instances, however, the Board demonstrated inclusive governance 
practices that were conducive to the participation of women.  First, board members 
indicated that the times and dates of board and committee meetings were flexible and 
were determined by means of consensus.  One participant described this process: 
We have the meetings in the afternoon, and it was primarily on the bases of the 
consensus of the Board as to which time frame would best suit everybody’s 
schedule.  Most of the work is done through the board committees…The 
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 committees generally meet in the morning.  Each committee works out what 
works best for the committee members.43 
 
This ensures that all board members are able to attend board and committee meetings 
and participate in board decisions.   
Second, the Board consistently used gender neutral language in organizational 
documents throughout the pre-merger and post-merger periods.  The Board Chair was 
always referred to as the “Chair” or “he/she”, in its annual reports, member newsletters, 
and news releases.44  As stated in the previous chapter, the use of gender neutral 
language may be a small detail, but it is worth noting because it shows a divergence 
from traditional board practice where the term “Chairman” and the conception of a 
director as male was common practice.   
More significantly, however, is the presence of women in influential board 
positions in both CCS phases (see Table 5.2).  The positions of Chair, 1st Vice Chair, 
and 2nd Vice Chair (and 3rd Vice Chair) represent key board positions.  These positions 
often include additional responsibilities and time commitments, such as public and 
media relations duties.  In the pre-merger phase, women occupied the positions of 2nd 
Vice Chair (2001 and 2002) and 3rd Vice Chair (2001).  This means that women 
occupied at least one seat on the Executive Committee.  As discussed in Chapter Three, 
the Executive Committee is a key decision making body with considerable influence 
over important board decisions.  So, this provided important opportunities for women’s 
perspectives to influence key board decisions.   
In the first year of the post-merger period (2003) no women occupied a chair 
position and, therefore, no women served on the Executive Committee.  In 2004, 
however, women regained their place in key board positions.  From 2004 to 2006, the 
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      Table 5.2 CCS Chair Positions, 2001 - 2006 
Period Year Chair Vice Chair 2
nd Vice 
Chair 
3rd Vice 
Chair 
Pre-
merger 2001 
Bill 
Wellburn 
Terry 
McPhail 
Tilly 
Marxreiter 
Karen 
Kesteloo 
 2002 Bill Wellburn Bob Garnett 
Tilly 
Marxreiter N/A 
Post-
merger 2003 
Bill 
Wellburn Bob Garnett Daniel Burns N/A 
 2004 Bill Wellburn Bob Garnett 
Karen 
Kesteloo N/A 
 2005 Bill Wellburn Bob Garnett 
Karen 
Kesteloo N/A 
 2006 Bill Wellburn Bob Garnett 
Karen 
Kesteloo N/A 
 
     Source: CCS Annual Reports. 
 
     Note: Female candidates in bold script 
 
 
 
position of 2nd Vice Chair was occupied by a female.  Furthermore, the abolition of the 
Executive Committee in 2004 broadened the overall scope of the decision making 
process.  One participant commented on the decision to eliminate this entity: “The trend 
in governance is to eliminate the Executive Committee, which we have done at CCS.  
Every issue is before the Board and everyone has an equal opportunity to speak up.”45  
In effect, this dispersal and decentralization of power increased the number of 
opportunities for women to influence key policy decisions. 
 It is important to note that there was little indication that participants perceived 
patriarchy or sexism as issues in CCS Board procedures or practices.  First, most 
participants did not mention issues of patriarchy or sexism on the Board.  Second, while 
one woman felt that the Board was less responsive to her views than to those of others, 
she did not perceive this to be a result of her gender: 
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 I think by and large women are accorded respect.  But the difference in this 
respect is not based on gender, [but] on other assessments that they make of us as 
directors.  But there [is] no difficulty of women speaking up.  I am...thinking 
about senior management - there is a fair mix there, but it is definitely male-
dominated in terms of style or culture.  I don’t mean that women are oppressed 
but it is male led.  They provide the impetus for stuff flowing down from the 
CEO...They don’t agree with my position, but it is not because I am a woman.  
They don’t think I have enough business experience so I rank lower for those 
reasons, but it is not because I am a woman.46 
 
Despite her suggestion that the Board’s “style or culture” was male-dominated, she did 
not perceive it as a barrier to women’s participation, or an explanation for why the 
Board was less responsive for her views. 
Overall, proposition 4B is supported by the CCS case.  Although the Board did 
not have gender sensitive policies, it had a flexible approach to the setting of board 
meeting dates and times, consistently used gender neutral language, and promoted 
women to influential board positions in both the pre-merger and post-merger phases.  
Finally, the abolishment of the Executive Committee in 2004 decentralized the decision 
making process, and further increased the number of opportunities for women to 
influence key board decisions.  
 
5.3 Summary 
 
In summary, the CCS case shows support for proposition 1B and 4B.  First, while 
the CCS Board did not mention diversity in annual reports or members newsletters, it 
explicitly and publicly addressed the decline in women’s representation in the post-
merger phase.  This suggests that because diversity levels were high in the pre-merger 
phase, the Board did not perceive a need to discuss the issue of diversity.  Next, the CCS 
case does not support proposition 2B.  Neither the pre-merger or post-merger CCS 
Board had a formal diversity policy expressing its commitment to the achievement of 
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 representational diversity.  Third, the CCS case did not support proposition 3B.  The 
CCS Board did not proactively recruit women through formal or informal recruitment 
mechanisms in either the pre-merger or post-merger period.  The experience of one 
female board member suggests that instances of proactive recruitment were likely the 
result of personal conviction as opposed to a collective effort by the CCS Board.  Still, it 
demonstrated that personal encouragement and support can play a significant role in 
one’s decision to run for the board.   Finally, both the pre-merger and post-merger CCS 
boards show support for proposition 4B.  While the CCS Board did not have gender 
sensitive policies, it had flexible meeting dates and times and consistently used gender 
neutral language.  Further, in the pre-merger period, women occupied several chair 
positions and, therefore, were members of the Executive Committee.  Although no 
women served in chair positions or on the Executive Committee in 2003, women 
regained their presence in key board positions from 2004 to 2006.  Finally, the abolition 
of the Executive Committee in 2004 decentralized the decision making process, opening 
up the decision making process to include all board members, and women in general. 
In the following chapter, the results of the two case studies are compared and 
contrasted.  As well, alternative explanations and additional factors that potentially 
contributed to the overall levels of board diversity in both cases are explored. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the findings of a cross-case analysis of the SMS and CCS cases are 
presented.  The main objective of this chapter is to highlight key factors that facilitated 
or inhibited the achievement of board diversity in the two cases presented in this study, 
and to make analytical generalizations from these findings.  In the first section, the 
findings of the two case studies regarding the theoretical propositions outlined in 
Chapter Two are compared and contrasted.  In the second part of this chapter, alternative 
explanations that may explain different outcomes in the level of board diversity between 
the two case studies are explored. 
 
6.2 Theoretical Propositions 
 
In this section, the eight theoretical propositions that fall under the four key areas 
of inquiry are addressed.  The findings of the CCS and SMS cases are compared and 
contrasted, and the implications of these findings for democratically elected boards 
wanting to achieve representational diversity are discussed.   
 
6.2.1 Problem Recognition 
 
The first two theoretical propositions of this study fall under the first area of 
inquiry, problem recognition.  These propositions state: 
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 1A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not consider their homogeneity, or lack of diversity, to be 
problematic. 
 
1B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will consider homogeneity, or lack of diversity, as problematic. 
 
The SMS case study supports proposition 1A, while the CCS case, specifically in its 
post-merger phase, supports proposition 1B. 
The SMS Board did not demonstrate that diversity was a priority issue for the 
Board in the period under study, despite the fact that women’s representation never 
exceeded 11.1 per cent.  Although the Board made broad references to diversity in 
annual reports and discussed the issue of diversity among board members, it did not 
publicly or formally recognize a diversity problem, or take deliberate action to address 
board homogeneity. 
In contrast, the CCS Board recognized homogeneity as problematic in its post-
merger period.  The CCS Board did not mention the issue of diversity during the pre-
merger period when women’s representation was 43.8 per cent.  In its post-merger 
period, the CCS Board responded to a drop in women’s representation after the 2004 
board election by publicly and explicitly recognizing gender homogeneity as 
problematic.  The Board took specific steps to address governance issues, including the 
issue of women’s representation, with the “Leading the Way” public awareness 
campaign.  In 2005 and 2006, the Board once again did not mention the issue of 
diversity.  This pattern suggests that the CCS Board did not address the issue of diversity 
in the pre-merger phase and in 2005 and 2006 because it was satisfied with its overall 
level of representational diversity.  The CCS Board’s response to declining diversity 
levels indicates that the Board was keenly aware of its demographic make-up. 
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 In both cases, research participants offered varying interpretations about the 
board’s commitment to diversity.  The views of research participants ranged from those 
who said that the issue of diversity was consistently discussed by the board, to those 
who noted that it was only incidentally considered.  While there may have been various 
degrees of individual support for diversity on both boards, the key difference between 
the two cases is that the CCS Board presented a unified leadership position regarding the 
decrease in women’s representation in its 2004 annual report.  This suggests that the 
desire to increase women’s representation was supported by enough directors to make it 
an action issue for the Board.   
These findings are significant because they support the argument that, left to their 
own devices, boards will not diversity.  They must make representational diversity a 
priority issue and be deliberate and purposive in their attempt to increase board 
diversity.  The comparison between the two cases also underscores the importance of 
publicly acknowledging the problem of homogeneity.  It is more difficult to renege on a 
commitment when it has been publicly announced.  Also, such statements likely 
resonate with women and potentially entice them to come forward.  Finally, the CCS 
case shows that ongoing support for representational diversity is critical to ensure that 
the board does not revert to homogeneity once diversity has been achieved. 
 
6.2.2 Formal Diversity Policies 
 
The next two theoretical propositions deal with the area of formal diversity 
policies.  These propositions are: 
2A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not have a formal diversity policy. 
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 2B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will have a formal diversity policy. 
 
In both cases, the board did not have a formal diversity policy.  So, while the SMS case 
supports proposition 2A, the CCS case does not support proposition 2B. 
Participants noted two main objections to the implementation of a formal diversity 
policy.  The first argument against a formal diversity policy was that all members had an 
equal opportunity to serve on the Board in that they were granted the same formal rights 
and were not discriminated against in the election process.  The SMS Personal 
Harassment Policy embodied this view, whereby women were protected against formal 
and overt discrimination.  As well, some participants noted that the CCS Board did not 
discriminate against women, and that all candidates were treated the same throughout 
the nomination, recruitment and electoral processes.1  This reflects the notion of 
democratic equality as argued by theorists of liberal democracy, such as Locke, Dahl 
and Schumpeter.  According to this view, individuals are guaranteed formal and legal 
rights that provide all people with an equal opportunity to participate in democratic 
processes. 
Although important, formal and legal equality does not necessarily provide women 
and visible minorities with the ability to overcome informal social, political and cultural 
barriers that prevent them from attaining leadership positions in democratic institutions.  
Here, the difference between the notions of equality and equity merits attention.  While 
the concept of equality refers to the notions of uniformity and sameness, the notion of 
equity deals with issues of fairness and justice.  Although different, both notions are 
pertinent to the issue of gender equality in co-operatives.  For example, in terms of 
leadership structures, the overall goal is to achieve equal representation and, ultimately, 
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 equal political power for men and women.  However, as discussed in Chapter One, 
feminist theorists importantly point out that the equal treatment of men and women in a 
context of inequality simply serves to perpetuate the status quo.  The domestic division 
of labour, gender stereotypes and sexual discrimination continue to inhibit the 
achievement of equal social and political status between men and women.  As a result, 
differential, or equitable, treatment provided by a formal diversity policy may be 
required to overcome those barriers that prevent women’s equal participation in 
representative institutions.  Procedural equity in recruitment, nomination and electoral 
processes may be required to achieve equal gender representation.  Finally, the 
implementation of equitable board processes may be required so women can exercise 
equal political power during the decision making process. 
The second concern of participants regarding a formal diversity policy was that it 
may hinder the board’s ability to recruit strong directors and risks alienating minority 
groups by recruiting female or ethnic minority “tokens.”  However, the implementation 
of a formal diversity policy and the requirement that candidates be skilled and competent 
are not mutually exclusive.  For example, the CCS formal regional diversity policy 
worked alongside a recruitment strategy that emphasized specific merit criteria.  This 
policy was carried out by using a ward system whereby the top contenders of specific 
communities were awarded board positions, even if they did not receive the most votes.  
Yet, the formal regional diversity policy was supported by most members as well as the 
Board because it is widely accepted and assumed that one’s regional identity provides 
them with a unique and important perspective.  In effect, the formal regional diversity 
policy was considered an essential part of fair and equitable democratic governance.   
 120
 This broad support of regional diversity from CCS members and directors raises an 
important question about how diversity is viewed within the co-operative sector.  While 
gender and ethnic board diversity were considered beneficial but not required, regional 
diversity was considered essential to good democratic governance.  Why might certain 
types of diversity be considered more important, or acceptable, than other types of 
diversity?  Feminist critiques on the public-private dichotomy of liberal democratic 
theory provide one perspective from which to understand this issue.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the theory of liberal democracy rests upon the assumption that life can be 
divided into two separate and distinct parts - the public (or political) and the private (or 
domestic) - and that private life is irrelevant to public life.  To guarantee gender 
diversity, credit unions must deal with matters typically considered private in nature, 
such as family and childcare.  In terms of ethnic diversity, credit unions need to confront 
issues such as language, religion, or culture, which are typically considered to be private 
affairs.  In contrast, guarantees of regional diversity do not demand discussions of 
private matters and, therefore, are more likely to be accepted by members and directors.   
However, if it is assumed that private matters are relevant to, and not distinctly 
separate from, public life, formal gender and ethnic diversity policies may be viewed as 
more supportable to members and directors.  So, despite the finding that the CCS Board 
did not have a formal gender diversity policy, it is argued that a formal diversity policy 
is an effective method for ensuring representational diversity on democratically elected 
boards. 
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 6.2.3 Proactive Recruitment Strategies 
 
The theoretical propositions that fall under the third area, proactive recruitment 
strategies, are: 
3A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
3B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
While the SMS case supports proposition 3A, the CCS case does not support proposition 
3B.  However, the experience of one female board member suggests that a proactive 
approach to recruitment and personal encouragement may have a significant effect on 
one’s decision to run for the board. 
 The SMS Board did not proactively recruit female candidates to the Board 
through the formal recruitment process or by publicly announcing the need for more 
female directors.   Rather, the central objective of the formal SMS recruitment strategy 
was to recruit candidates that met specific merit criteria.  As well, board members and 
managers were not specifically instructed to seek female candidates.  Whether one’s 
gender background was considered during the recruitment process was a result of 
personal beliefs, as opposed to a collective effort by the Board.  
 Likewise, the CCS Board did not proactively recruit women to the board by 
means of a formal recruitment strategy or by publicly calling women to come forward 
for election.  In the pre-merger period, the CCS recruitment strategy consisted of a 
general Call for Nominations without any indication of preferred skills, background, or 
experiences.  After its merger with SMS, the CCS Board adopted several SMS 
recruitment strategies that emphasized merit criteria, such as a gap analysis of the Board, 
a formal candidate interview, and a candidate endorsation process.  Like the SMS case, 
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 there were no explicit instructions for directors or managers to specifically look for 
female or ethnic minority candidates. 
 Nevertheless, the experience of one female candidate sheds light on the potential 
role of proactive recruitment strategies in increasing the level of representational 
diversity in democratic leadership structures.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Christine Hansen was approached by her branch manger who noted his belief that the 
board needed more capable women, and encouraged her to stand for election.  This 
provided the impetus for her initial inquiry into the role and responsibilities of directors 
and, ultimately, her decision to run for the board.  In the end, Christine’s decision to run 
for the board helped increase the level of representational diversity from 23.1 per cent in 
2004 to 36.4 per cent in 2005. 
 
6.2.4 Responsive Governance 
 
 In regards to the fourth area of inquiry, responsive governance, the final two 
theoretical propositions of this study are: 
4A: Boards that do not have a critical mass of women or visible minorities will 
not demonstrate responsive governance practices. 
 
4B: Boards that have a critical mass of women or visible minorities will 
demonstrate responsive governance practices. 
 
The findings of the SMS case study support proposition 4A.  As well, the overall 
findings of the CCS case support proposition 4B. 
 The SMS Board demonstrated some governance practices that are conducive to 
the participation of diverse groups, such as flexible board meeting dates and times.  
However, the SMS Board did not demonstrate a conscious effort to make it easier for 
women to serve on the Board, or respond to their needs and identities.  For example, the 
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 SMS Board did not have gender sensitive policies and, in some instances, used 
masculine language in organizational documents when referring to the role of a director 
or specific board positions.  In addition, no women occupied a SMS chair position 
between 1995 and 2001 and, therefore, no women sat on the Executive Committee. 
 Like the SMS Board, the CCS Board did not have gender sensitive policies and 
were willing to accommodate diverse schedules with flexible meeting dates and times. 
 Still, CCS consistently used gender neutral language in organizational documents.  As 
stated above, this is important because it represents a shift from traditional board terms 
and practices whereby directors were perceived to be men.  These findings were 
consistent for both the pre-merger and post-merger periods.   
The most significant differences between the two cases are the presence of women 
in key board positions on the CCS Board and the abolishment of the CCS Executive 
Committee in the post-merger period.  First, during the pre-merger phase, women held 
several chair positions and served on the Executive Committee.  In the first year of the 
post-merger period, no women occupied a chair position and, as a result, there was no 
female representation on the Executive Committee.  However, from 2004 to 2006 
women held chair positions.  This is important in that board members were elected to 
chair positions by their fellow directors.2   
Second, the abolishment of the Executive Committee in 2004 marked a significant 
change in the democratic functioning of the CCS Board.  According to elite theorists, a 
key obstacle to the achievement of democracy is the presence of elite power structures 
wherein decision making power is centralized and concentrated in the hands of few who 
share similar social backgrounds.  According to experts on organizational governance, 
the Executive Committee has substantial decision making authority, while other 
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 committees typically make recommendations to all directors.3  Although the Executive 
Committee approach may save time during director meetings, it may be viewed as an 
elite group and can result in a “two-tiered” board.4  As a result, the number of different 
perspectives included in the decision making process is limited, particularly when the 
Executive Committee is comprised of directors from similar social backgrounds.   
Experts in organizational governance suggest that the absence of an Executive 
Committee can foster a greater sense of ownership among all directors over the board’s 
decisions.5  The abolishment of the Executive Committee had the important, and 
perhaps unintended, effect of opening up the decision making process to women.  
Ultimately, the absence of an Executive Committee decentralizes and disperses political 
power.  In turn, women and other under represented groups can exercise political power 
on credit union boards and effectively contribute to key board decisions. 
So, the SMS and CCS cases support the view that the achievement of long-term 
representational diversity requires an inclusive governance approach that is able to meet 
a wide range of life situations.  Responsive governance is about keeping people engaged 
once they have been elected to the Board.  People who run for, and serve in, elected 
leadership positions contribute a great deal of time and energy to their responsibilities.  
Therefore, it is imperative that board members believe they are able to contribute to the 
governance process; if not, they are not likely to return because it is not worth their time.  
A flexible governance approach accommodates various life situations and inclusive 
decision making practices are important for maintaining representational diversity in 
elected leadership positions. 
To summarize, in this section, the SMS case was compared and contrasted to the 
CCS case in both its pre-merger and post-merger phases.  The implications of these 
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 findings were discussed.  First, the SMS case supports proposition 1A.  The CCS case 
supports proposition 1B in the post-merger period, but not in the pre-merger period.  
Nevertheless, it is argued that, because CCS had achieved a high degree of 
representational diversity in the pre-merger phase, it is likely that the Board did not 
perceive its diversity levels to be problematic and, therefore, did not explicitly address 
the issue of diversity.  Overall, this study supports the view that boards must take 
deliberate action to diversify their leadership’s characteristics, and without such action 
they will not diversify.   
Next, while the SMS case supports proposition 2A, the CCS case does not support 
proposition 2B.  This suggests that a formal diversity is not necessary to achieve 
representational diversity.  Yet, the CCS formal regional diversity policy serves as an 
excellent example of a successful and widely supported diversity policy that worked 
alongside other director criteria.   
Third, the SMS case supports proposition 3A, while the CCS case does not 
supports proposition 3B.  This suggests that proactive recruitment strategies are not 
required to achieve representational diversity.  However, the CCS case study revealed 
that, although there was no formal or collective effort to recruit women, the recruitment 
effort of one branch manager provided the initial impetus in one woman’s decision to 
run for the Board.  The branch manager’s actions illustrate how proactive recruitment 
effort can be an effective tool for achieving representational diversity.   
Finally, the SMS case supports proposition 4A, and the CCS case supports 
proposition 4B.  In effect, the findings of this study support the view that boards must 
consider the needs and identities of directors and provide directors with meaningful 
opportunities to participate in the decision making process.  Given the amount of time 
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 and energy that is required to sit on a board, it is important for board members to feel as 
though they are able to contribute.  Otherwise, they are not likely to return in the future, 
making it difficult to maintain diversity over the long-run.   
In the following section, alternative explanations for different diversity outcomes 
among the two case studies are explored. 
 
6.3 Alternative Explanations 
 
In this section, four alternative explanations for the difference in diversity levels in 
the SMS and CCS cases are discussed.  As noted in Chapter Two, a category entitled 
“other influences” was included in the categorical matrix that guided the analysis of case 
study data.  The literatures on democracy, representation, and board diversity helped to 
identify alternative explanations for outcomes in diversity levels.  Four alternative 
explanations are considered, including board size, recruitment practices, director 
turnover, and organizational culture. 
 
6.3.1 Board Size 
 
The first alternative explanation considered here is the effect of board size on 
diversity levels.  After surveying credit union boards in Saskatchewan, de Clercy and 
Hammond Ketilson found that boards with more than 7 members tended to have more 
women directors than boards with less than seven members.6  So, by increasing its size, 
a board provides more opportunities for women to be elected.  A similar pattern is 
revealed when board size is compared across the SMS and CCS cases, and between the 
pre-merger and post-merger CCS boards.  Between 1995 and 2001, the SMS Board 
maintained a board size of 9 directors and averaged 11.1 per cent representation per 
year.  During its pre-merger phase, the CCS Board averaged 16 directors and 43.8 per 
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 cent female representation.  In the post-merger phase, the CCS averaged 12.8 directors 
and 31.4 per cent female representation.  Overall, the SMS and CCS cases support the 
argument that increasing board size will lead to higher diversity levels. 
However, changes in board size cannot explain changes in diversity levels on the 
post-merger CCS Board.  For example, the total number of directors decreased by two in 
2005, while the number of female directors increased by one.  In the end, the SMS and 
CCS cases suggest that larger boards may have a structural advantage over smaller in 
achieving diversity; however, the post-merger CCS Board demonstrates that additional 
factors also play an important role in the outcome of diversity levels.  
 
6.3.2 Recruitment Practices 
 
The second alternative explanation considers the impact of recruitment processes 
on board diversity.  After its merger with SMS in 2002, the CCS Board implemented the 
SMS recruitment strategy which focused on recruiting candidates with particular 
business skills and board experience.  Overall, women averaged approximately 9.1 per 
cent of SMS board candidates per year (see Table 6.1).7  In its pre-merger phase, CCS 
averaged 41.9 female candidates per election (see Table 6.2).  In contrast, women 
averaged only 20.2 per cent of CCS board candidates per year in the post-merger period 
(see Table 6.2).  The low proportion of female candidates on the SMS Board, and the 
low proportion of CCS female board candidates in the post-merger period, is correlated 
with the use of a recruitment strategy largely focused on attracting candidates with 
particular business skills and board experience.   
Two points may be made in regards to these findings.  First, recruitment 
practices that are narrowly focused on business skills and board experience are more 
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           Table 6.1 SMS Board Candidates, by Gender, 1995-2002 
Year Candidates N 
Women 
N 
Women 
(%) 
Candidates 
Elected 
N 
Women 
Elected 
N 
1995* 7 0 0 3 0 
1996* 8 0 0 3 0 
1997* 8 1 12.5 3 1 
1998* 4 1 25.0 3 0 
1999 7 - - 3 0 
2000* 6 1 16.7 3 1 
2001 - - - 3 0 
2002 - - - 3 0 
   
         Source: CCS Corporate Affairs Department 
         *Denotes years for which full data points were available.  
   
 
 
   Table 6.2 CCS Board Candidates, by Gender, 2001-2006 
Period Year CandidatesN 
Women 
N 
Women 
(%) 
Candidates 
Elected 
N 
Women 
Elected 
N 
2001 16 7 43.8 5 2 Pre-
merger 2002 10 4 40.0 6 3 
2003 9 3 33.3 4 1 
2004 9 0 0 4 0 
2005 13 4 30.8 4 3 
Post-
merger 
2006 6 1 16.7 4 1 
 
   Source: CCS Corporate Affairs Department 
 
 
 
likely to attract male candidates than female candidates.  The emphasis on recruiting 
candidates according to specific merit criteria is typical of many boards today.8  Given 
the legal and financial complexities of credit union governance, the importance of 
recruiting capable directors cannot be understated.  As one participant noted “any type 
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 of a board that is responsible for other people’s money... and large amounts of it...need 
to have the skill level and competence to do that with integrity and have confidence of 
the people that entrust that money to them.”9  Still, the implications of candidate 
recruitment practices on board diversity levels should be considered.  According to 
Statistics Canada, 52 per cent of business professional and those in financial occupations 
are women.10  However, while women constitute 36 per cent of managerial positions, 
only 26 per cent of senior management positions are occupied by women.11  Also, men 
are more likely than women to have previous board experience.  According to the 2005 
Catalysts Census of Women Board Directors of the FP 500, women comprise only 12 
per cent of all board positions.12  Among co-operative organizations, only 15.6 per cent 
of directors are women.13 
 The second point highlights the need to complement such recruitment practices 
with additional mechanisms to bring in a diverse cohort of candidates.  As one research 
participant noted, “[I]f one is not really careful, one could get really focused on the skills 
needed and lose focus on other things that make credit union boards unique, which are 
the representation of the population, diversity, the gender mix...So that needs to be kept 
at the forefront as well and entrusted to the person doing the gap analysis and making 
that a criterion as well.”14  In the case of CCS, the proportion of female candidates went 
from zero in 2004 to 30.8 per cent in 2005.  This marked increase is correlated with the 
CCS “Leading the Way” public awareness campaign that was intended to raise 
awareness about governance issues, including the issue of diversity.  So, it is argued that 
although the practice of recruiting individuals with specific business skills and board 
experience continued, the Board’s effort to reach out to members was successful in 
attracting a more diverse group of candidates.  In effect, this observation lends support 
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 to the argument that boards must undertake direct action to diversify their leadership 
characteristics. 
 
6.3.3 Director Turnover 
 
A third factor to consider is the rate of board member turnover and its potential 
effect on board diversity levels.  Studies in the field of political science have shown that 
incumbent candidates have a substantial advantage over non-incumbent candidates in 
the electoral process.15  In its article, “Unity Through Diversity,” CCA discussed the 
need for a “reasonable churn rate” so boards can build on director experience while, at 
the same time, bring in fresh perspectives.16  Term limits force incumbents to step down, 
and provide non-incumbent candidates with a greater chance of electoral success.  For 
boards that are dominated by white males, it has been argued that term limits may 
provide women and minority group members with more opportunities to get involved on 
the board.17  
The SMS Board limited directors to serving a maximum of three consecutive 
terms.  The average length of tenure for directors who served on the SMS Board from 
1995 to 2002 was 5.17 years (see Appendix G).  The SMS Board also averaged 1.38 
successful non-incumbent directors per election (see Table 6.3).  On the other hand, the 
CCS Board did not have director term limits in either the pre-merger or post-merger 
periods.  The average length of tenure for CCS directors who served on the CCS Board 
from 2001 to 2006 was 11.63 years (see Appendix H).  Finally, the CCS Board averaged 
only 0.33 successful non-incumbents per election (see Table 6.3).18   
Overall, the SMS Board had higher rates of director turnover than the CCS Board.  
This indicates that higher rates of director turnover do not necessarily lead to higher  
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     Table 6.3 Success of Non-incumbents Candidates, SMS and CCS 
Case Years N 
Non-incumbents 
N 
Non-incumbents 
Elected/Year 
N 
SMS 8 11 1.38 
CCS 6 2 0.33 
     
     Source: SMS and CCS Annual Reports 
 
 
levels of board diversity.  This pattern also suggests that low rates of director turnover 
simply help maintain the status quo regarding board composition and that there is 
nothing inherent about term limits that facilitate diversity.  Instead, these findings 
support the view that term limits may be effective in promoting diversity only when 
coupled with additional board diversification strategies. 
 
6.3.4 Organizational Culture 
 
So far, some specific aspects of organizational life have been examined separately.  
The fourth alternative explanation examines how, when considered together, these 
specific aspects of organizational life may provide insight into the role of organizational 
culture in the achievement of board diversity.  Organizational culture has been broadly 
defined as the formal and informal structures, practices, beliefs, norms and values that 
determine “the way things work around here.”19   
Because this study did not set out to examine all aspects of organizational culture, 
an in depth analysis of this topic is not possible.  Nevertheless, the SMS Board and the 
CCS Board shared some similar board practices and processes, such as the absence of a 
formal diversity policy and the recruitment of board candidates according to specific 
merit criteria.  However, when other aspects of organizational life are considered 
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 together, the overall difference between the CCS Board and the SMS Board becomes 
more acute.  In several instances, the CCS Board demonstrated a more inclusive 
approach to governance than the SMS Board.  For example, in its post-merger phase, the 
CCS Board overtly responded to board homogeneity and abolished the Executive 
Committee, thereby creating a more inclusive decision making process.  In both phases, 
the CCS Board consistently used gender neutral language and elected female board 
members to important board positions.  Together, these behaviours and practices point 
toward an inclusive organizational culture that is conducive to the participation of 
women.   
In sum, this section explored alternative explanations for differences in levels of 
representational diversity between the SMS and CCS cases, as well as between the pre-
merger and post-merger CCS boards.  First, the potential effect of board size on 
diversity levels was considered.  Overall, the SMS and CCS cases support the argument 
that larger boards are more likely to be diverse than smaller boards.  Nonetheless, a 
closer look at diversity levels in the post-merger CCS case revealed that other factors 
also have a significant impact on diversity levels.  
Second, the influence of recruitment practices that narrowly focus on merit criteria 
in regards to business skills and board experience was examined.  The case studies 
reveal that low numbers of female candidates were correlated with such recruitment 
practices.  However, the findings also suggest that deliberate action by the board to 
broaden knowledge about governance issues is effective in diversifying the pool of 
board candidates. 
Next, the potential impact of director turnover on diversity levels was explored.  
Interestingly, the findings suggest that high rates of director turnover were correlated 
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 with low levels of representational diversity, while low rates of director turnover were 
correlated with high levels of diversity.  This suggests that even those boards with high 
turnover rates require deliberate action to diversify. 
The final alternative explanation explored in this section was the potential 
influence of organizational culture on diversity levels.  The various behaviours and 
practices of the boards provide an indication of their respective organizational cultures.  
Overall, the CCS Board demonstrated more inclusive behaviour and practices, 
suggesting the presence of an inclusive organizational culture in which women are more 
likely to participate.  
 
6.4 Summary 
 
To summarize, this chapter set out to compare and contrast the two case studies in 
a cross-case analysis.  In the first section, each theoretical proposition was considered, 
and the implications of the case study findings were discussed.  The second section of 
this chapter explored four alternative explanations: board size, recruitment practices, 
director turnover and organizational culture.  Overall, this study supports the view that 
boards must recognize homogeneity as problematic and take deliberate action towards 
achieving representational diversity.  Even though boards may introduce structures that 
are favourable to the achievement of diversity, such as large board size or director term 
limits, it is unlikely that these structures alone will generate representational diversity.  
This means that boards must be willing to take a leadership role and to make value 
statements about diversity and the need to include members from marginalized groups.  
In the CCS case, such value statements and actions were present in several instances.  
For example, the Board publicly stated its dissatisfaction with its degree of women’s 
 134
 representation.  This was followed by the launching of the “Leading the Way” public 
awareness campaign.  Also, although not directly related to gender diversity, the formal 
regional diversity policy signifies a clear statement of support by the Board for regional 
diversity and constitutes a deliberate attempt to ensure proportional regional 
representation.  As well, the proactive recruitment and encouragement of one branch 
manager were instrumental in convincing one non-incumbent woman to run for the 
board.  In all instances, there was a clear statement of values followed by deliberate 
action to ensure representational diversity. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In conclusion, democratic governance is a defining feature of co-operative 
organizations.  However, recent studies on representational diversity on co-operative 
boards revealed that Canadian co-operative leadership structures possess a diversity 
problem.  This suggests that co-operative organizations are missing important views, 
opinions and social perspectives in their decision making centres.  So, the main objective 
of this thesis was to create a greater understanding of the facilitators and barriers of 
representational diversity on co-operative boards of directors.  Specifically, it focused on 
the representation of women on co-operative boards.  Initially, this study also set out to 
examine the representation of visible minorities; however, this was not possible due to 
the lack of empirical examples with adequate visible minority board representation.   
 This research project was divided into six main chapters.  In Chapter Two, the 
pertinent literature from the fields of political science, co-operatives and board diversity 
was reviewed.  Perspectives from the field of political science were applied to the co-
operative context, and a theoretical framework for co-operative democracy and 
descriptive representation was developed.  In Chapter Three, two core research questions 
were posed.  How do boards achieve diversity? How do diverse boards maintain their 
diversity?  Previous works on women’s representation in political institutions and co-
operative organizations helped to identify four main areas of inquiry.  These four areas 
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 include problem recognition, formal diversity policies, proactive recruitment strategies, 
and responsive governance.  For each area, two specific theoretical propositions were 
posited, for a total of eight theoretical propositions (see Table 7.1).  It was argued that, 
to achieve and maintain diversity, board must recognize homogeneity as problematic, 
employ a formal diversity policy, proactively recruitment women, and display 
responsive governance practices. 
This study adopted a case study approach to test its theoretical propositions.  
Two case studies were selected, one of which was a homogenous board and another that 
was diverse in terms of its leadership’s representational characteristics.  Both cases were 
selected from a cohort of credit unions in the Greater Vancouver Area that were active in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This ensured that the case studies were temporally and 
demographically comparable.  The first case study was the SMS Board of Directors 
which averaged 11.1 per cent women’s representation and, therefore, was homogenous 
in its gender composition.  The second case study was the CCS Board of Directors.  
Because SMS and CCS merged in June of 2002, the CCS case was examined in two 
separate periods: the pre-merger phase and the post-merger phase.  The pre-merger 
phase included the years 2001 and 2002, while the post-merger phase covered the time 
period from 2003 to 2006.  Women comprised an average of 43.8 and 31.8 per cent of 
directors in the pre-merger and post-merger periods respectively. 
The findings of the case studies were presented in chapters four, five and six.  In 
view of the first area, problem recognition, the findings of this study support 
propositions 1A and 1B.  The SMS Board did not overtly recognize homogeneity as 
problematic.  In contrast, the post-merger CCS Board publicly and explicitly recognized 
a decrease in women’s representation as problematic.  The CCS case also indicated that  
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 Table 7.1 Theoretical Propositions and Results 
Key Area of 
Inquiry 
 
Proposition SMS 
CCS 
Pre-
merger 
CCS 
Post-
merger
1A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of 
their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not consider their 
homogeneity, or lack of diversity, to be 
problematic. 
 
Yes - - 
Problem 
Recognition 1B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their 
leadership’s representational characteristics 
will consider homogeneity, or lack of 
diversity, to be problematic. 
 
- No Yes 
2A:  Boards that are homogenous in terms of 
their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not have a formal 
diversity policy. 
 
Yes - - 
Diversity 
Policy 2B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their 
leadership’s representational characteristics 
will have a formal diversity policy. 
 
- No No 
3A: Boards that are homogenous in terms of 
their leadership’s representational 
characteristics will not have proactive 
recruitment strategies. 
 
Yes - - 
Proactive 
Recruitment 3B: Boards that are diverse in terms of their 
leadership’s representational characteristics 
will have proactive recruitment strategies. 
 
- No No 
4A: Boards that do not have a critical mass 
of women or visible minorities will not 
demonstrate responsive governance 
practices. 
 
Yes - - 
Responsive 
Governance 4B: Boards that have a critical mass of 
women or visible minorities will demonstrate 
responsive governance practices. 
 
- Yes Yes 
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 diverse boards may not consistently address the issue of diversity, particularly when the 
overall level of representational diversity is satisfactory.  Still, diverse boards are 
conscious of their demographic composition, and will respond to decreases in diversity 
levels with a clear recognition that homogeneity is unacceptable.  At this point, the issue 
of diversity becomes an action issue for the board, wherein the board takes specific steps 
towards rectifying the problem of homogeneity, or a decrease in diversity levels.  
Because problem recognition requires the board to make a value statement about the 
issue of diversity, many board members must provide ongoing support for 
representational diversity and the initiatives put into place to achieve it. 
 In the second area, formal diversity policies, the case study findings support 
proposition 2A, but do not support proposition 2B.  In both cases, the board did not have 
a formal diversity policy.  Although a formal diversity policy may not be required to 
achieve diversity, the CCS case showed that formal diversity policies are effective for 
achieving diversity goals.  The CCS case had a formal regional diversity policy to ensure 
that the board proportionally represented the general membership in terms of its regional 
composition.  This suggests that it is acceptable for boards to implement aggressive 
policy measures to achieve diversity when the issue is strongly supported by the 
membership and the board.  This widespread support for the CCS regional diversity 
policy raises some significant questions about how boards and co-operative members 
understand diversity and how they view certain types of diversity as more important, or 
acceptable, than others. 
 As regards to the third area, proactive recruitment strategies, the case study 
findings support proposition 3A, but do not support proposition 3B.  In the case of SMS, 
the Board did not proactively recruit female candidates to run for the board.  Similarly, 
 140
 the pre-merger and post-merger CCS Board did not proactively recruit women.  
Nevertheless, the experience of one CCS female director shows that proactive 
recruitment and personal encouragement are effective means to increase a board’s 
overall diversity levels.  For example, when asked how she got involved on the Board, 
one research participant said she was approached by her branch manager who 
encouraged her to put her name forward for election.  After attending an information 
session of the role and duties of a director, she decided to run for the Board.  So, 
although the CCS Board did not have a formal or deliberate approach for attracting a 
diverse group of board candidates, this director’s experience demonstrated the 
significance and effectiveness of a proactive approach to candidate recruitment.   
 In view of the final area, responsive governance, the findings of this study 
support propositions 4A and 4B.  The SMS case study did not have a critical mass of 
women, and did not demonstrate responsive governance practices.  On the other hand, in 
both its pre-merger and post-merger phases, the CCS Board demonstrated several 
responsive governance practices.  In both periods, the CCS Board had a critical mass of 
women.  Some governance practices, such as the use of gender neutral language, are 
significant in that they demonstrate a divergence from traditional board language and a 
deliberate attempt to use inclusive language.  Further, once a board has achieved 
diversity, it is imperative that minority group members believe that they are able to 
contribute to the decision making process.  In the case of CCS in the pre-merger period, 
the presence of women in chair positions and, therefore, on the Executive Committee, 
was important.  Given the significance of the Executive Committee as a key decision 
making body, this ensured that the perspectives of women were included in the decision 
making process.  The abolition of the Executive Committee in the post-merger period in 
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 2004 further increased the inclusiveness of the decision making process by 
decentralizing and dispersing power to all directors, and women in general.  Directors 
put a substantial amount of time and energy toward being elected, and board 
membership requires a great deal of commitment from them.  As a result, it is important 
to make serving on the board worth their time.  With a positive board experience, 
minority group members are likely to run again, and may encourage other minority 
group members to serve on the board as well. 
 Overall, this research project revealed three broad findings.  First, to achieve 
diversity, co-operative boards need to explicitly state the need for diversity.  Second, this 
statement must be followed by deliberate action towards increasing representational 
diversity.  Finally, diverse boards must be aware and conscious of their level of 
representational diversity, respond to reversals in diversity levels with deliberate action, 
and ensure that board members are able to influence and meaningfully contribute to 
board decisions. 
 In the end, co-operatives should not hesitate to make value statements about 
diversity, or demonstrate leadership in addressing inequality and injustice within the 
organization itself and within the larger society.  The ability to draw upon diverse views, 
opinions and social perspectives is important to identify, and meet, the needs of 
members.  Co-operatives have a real interest in the development and well-being of their 
communities; a clear understanding of members’ needs is good business.  Finally, as 
socially responsible organizations, it is unacceptable for co-operatives to perpetuate the 
current status quo of social exclusion and inequality that exists in many communities 
today.  Co-operatives are local organizations that are well-situated to be agents of 
positive change.  By fostering social inclusion and empowering those who typically sit 
 142
 on the margins of economic, social, and political power, co-operatives can play an 
important role in the development of inclusive and cohesive communities. 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL 
 
This study was approved by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research 
Ethics Board on August 5, 2005.  Please note that ethics approval was required prior to 
the recruitment of potential cases and the final case selection.  As a result, some 
differences may appear between the original Application for Ethics Approval and the 
research approach described in this study.  However, the proposed method and consent 
and recruitment procedures remained the same. 
 
 
University of Saskatchewan 
Application for Ethics Approval 
 
1. Name of Researcher(s) 
Dr. Cristine de Clercy (Supervisor), Department of Political Studies 
Kimberly Brown (Graduate Student), student study for M.A. 
Proposed start date: August 2005 
Expected completion date: October 2005 
 
2. Title of Study 
Co-operative Democracy: Gender and Visible Minority representation on Credit Union 
Boards of Directors. 
 
3. Abstract 
The principle of democratic governance is a defining feature of co-operative 
organizations.  Members of the board of directors are the elected representatives of the 
membership and the central decision making bodies of co-operatives.  There is an 
expectation that, as democratic organizations, co-operatives should have adequate 
membership representation on their boards of directors.  However, empirical evidence 
suggests that many co-operative boards of directors lack the representation of women 
and visible minorities.  This lack of diversity is problematic for two reasons.  First, it 
suggests that certain social groups are systematically excluded from the democratic 
process, thus compromising the basic democratic principle of equality.  Second, the lack 
of diversity on co=operative boards of directors may jeopardize the ability of co-
operatives to meet the needs of their membership.  In order to understand their 
membership, co-operatives in diverse urban communities need to ensure that their 
boards of directors include the perspectives of various social groups. 
 
The main research question of this study is: Do recruitment strategies help facilitate the 
representation of women and visible minorities on credit union boards of directors?  The 
Research hypothesizes that recruitment strategies are key factors in facilitating the 
participation of women and visible minorities on credit union boards of directors. 
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 4. Funding 
This research project is supported by a graduate scholarship and support made available 
from the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives’ Social Sciences and Humanities 
research Council of Canada (SSHRC) project, “Co-operative Membership and 
Globalization: Creating Social Cohesion through Market Relations.”  The program of 
research is based on one year of funding. 
 
5. Participants 
The Researcher will contact and request the participation of approximately four 
individuals from each of three credit unions, for a total of approximately twelve 
participants.  Access to participants will require permission from participating 
organizations as well as consent from individual participants (see Section 6 below).  
There are four categories of people that will be selected for interviews: 1) former board 
members; 2) longest standing board members; 3) women and/or visible minorities on the 
board of directors.  In order to examine the influence of recruitment strategies on the 
representation of women and visible minorities on the Board, it is essential to draw upon 
the experiences and perceptions of women and visible minorities within these 
organizations. 
 
6. Consent 
Participants will be informed in writing that their participation is voluntary and may be 
withdrawn at any time during the research process.  This information will be included on 
participant questionnaires and all consent forms used for interview participants.  An 
Interview Consent Form will be signed by each participant prior to conducting any 
interviews.  the “Consent Form Guidelines” provided by the Advisory Committee on 
Ethics in Behavioural Science Research will be used to ensure that participants can 
provide informed consent for their participation.  Participants will indicate consent by 
returning a signed consent form to the Researcher by mail or fax.  The participants will 
be contacted individually in order to limit any feelings of coercion to participate or not 
to participate. 
 
Permission to interview board members of participating organizations will also be 
required.  Letters of consent to participate in the research will be submitted to the 
Advisory Committee on Ethics in Behavioural Science Research. 
 
No participants under the age of 18, or with cognitive impairments requiring caregiver 
consent, will be included in the research.  There are no relationships of dependency 
anticipated between the Researcher and the participants. 
 
7. Methods and Procedures 
The study will be based on qualitative research data gathered by personal interviews.  
This research will employ semi-structured interviews to be administered over the 
telephone.  Semi-structured interviews will follow basic themes to the research topic.  
The questions are intended to guide the participants and to garner their thoughtful 
processes.  It is expected that in some cases, depending on the nature of the response, 
that the discussion might go outside the expected scope of the interview.  The 
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 respondents will be allowed and encouraged to tell the stories they think are most 
important. 
 
In the interview process, the Researcher will comply with the following set of principles 
for conducting ethical research in the social and behavioural sciences: 
 
• Informed participant consent 
• Voluntary participation with the option to withdraw from research at any time 
• Confidentiality and privacy of participants 
• Respect for vulnerable persons (the research will not involve children or those 
with diminished capacities requiring informed consent from a care-giver) 
• No conflict of interest with researchers or pre-existing relationships of 
relationships of dependency between researchers and participants 
• Low risk and deception-free study methodologies 
• Secure storage of original data gathering documents at the Centre for the Study 
of Co-operatives 
 
8. Storage of Data 
Participant interview tapes, notes, and transcripts, and any correspondence 
documentation will be securely stored at the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives and 
held under the supervision of Dr. Lou Hammond Ketilson (advisory committee 
member).  This data will be held for 5 years, after which it will be destroyed.  
 
9. Dissemination of Results 
The results of the study will be presented in a thesis for credit toward the completion of 
a Master’s Program.  Results will also be presented in a publishable paper for the Centre 
for the Study of Co-operatives, the research unit funding this study.  The research results 
will also be available to the participants upon request.  The results may also be presented 
in conference proceedings and peer reviewed journal article (s). 
 
10. Risk and Deception 
No aspects of the study are anticipated to include risk or harm to participants.  there will 
be no participant deception used in this study. 
 
11. Confidentiality 
All reasonable efforts will be made to protect the identity of research participants and 
will be informed, through Interview Consent Forms.  Respondents will be informed of 
confidentiality issues related to their participation in the research, and their rights to 
withdraw as research participants.  There is a possibility that individual participants 
within each organization may be identifiable to one another.  Therefore, the Researcher 
will use pseudonyms and remove any identifying information from direct quotations in 
order to limit the loss of anonymity of participating individuals.  Taped interviews will 
be transcriber by a person working under a confidentiality agreement.  Data gathered 
through interview techniques will have all individually identifying information removed 
from the transcribed data and excluded from the final project findings. 
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 12. Data/Transcript Release 
Participants will have the opportunity to withdraw their responses after the interview and 
prior to the publication of the findings.  Participants will review the final transcript of 
the interview and sign an Interview Transcript Release Form from wherein they 
acknowledge that the transcript accurately reflects what they intended to say. 
 
13. Debriefing and Feedback 
Participants will be urged to contact the Researcher if they have any questions, concerns 
or comments.  The final report will be made available to any participant who requests it. 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled Co-operative Democracy: Gender and 
Visible Minority Representation on Credit Union Boards of Directors.  Please read the 
form carefully, and feel free to ask questions you might have. 
 
Purpose and Procedures: This research focuses on the nature of co-operative democracy, 
particularly the concept of member representation.  This study has two core research 
questions: How do boards achieve diversity?  How do diverse boards maintain their 
diversity? 
 
I would like to receive your responses to questions about your experiences as a board 
member, the board’s history, and changes that have occurred during your time as a board 
member.  You have been selected because of your position as a member of the [credit 
union name] Board. 
 
Your participation in this study is appreciated and completely voluntary.  It is expected 
that the interview should last between 30 and 45 minutes.  You may withdraw at any 
time without penalty during this process should you dell uncomfortable or at risk.  All 
interviews will be audio taped and you have the right to request the researcher to shut off 
the tape recorder at any time. 
 
Potential Risks: I will make every effort to preserve the confidentiality of your 
comments (see below), but you should be aware that controversial remarks, in the 
unlikely event they are associated with you, could have negative consequences for your 
relationship with other in you organizations or credit union community.  I will try to 
ensure that your identity is protected in the ways described below. 
 
Potential Benefits: Your participation will provide information regarding the 
representation of women and visible minorities on credit union boards of directors. 
Board diversity is a new research topic that has emerged in the last 10 to 15 years. 
Adequate member representation is a component of effective democratic governance 
and is important for credit unions that serve diverse memberships. 
 
Storage of Data: Participant interview tapes, notes, and transcripts, and any 
correspondence documentation will be securely stored at the Centre for the Study of Co-
operatives and held under the supervision of Dr. Lou Hammond Ketilson.  This data will 
be held for 5 years, after which it will be destroyed.  
 
Confidentiality: The findings of this study will be presented in a written thesis.  The 
interview transcripts will only be viewed by myself and authorized personnel such as a 
typist, who have signed confidentiality agreements.  I will make every efforts to 
maintain the confidentiality of each participant.  Because the participants for this study 
have been selected from small groups of people, all of whom are potentially known to 
each other, it is possible that you may be identified to other people on the basis of what 
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 you have said.  After you interview, and prior to the data being included in the final 
report, you will be given the opportunity to review the transcript of your interview, and 
add, alter, or delete information from the transcripts as you see fit. 
 
Right to Withdraw: your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the 
study for any reason, at any time, without penalty of any sort.  If you withdraw from the 
study at any time, any data that you have contributed will be destroyed at your request. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask at any 
point.  This study has been approved on ethical grounds b the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Science Research Ethics Board on August 5, 2005.  Any 
questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee 
through the Ethics Office (306-966-2084).  Out of town participants may call collect. 
 
If you have any comments or questions about the study, of if you would like to receive a 
copy of the results of the study, so not hesitate to contact me.  You can contact me at 
(306) 665-5603 or kdb544@mail.usask.ca. 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description above; I have been 
provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered 
satisfactorily.  I consent to participate in the study described above, understanding that I 
may withdraw this consent at any time.  A copy of this consent form has been given to 
me for my records. 
 
 
________________________   ________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
 
 
________________________   ________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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 APPENDIX C 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
This is an interview with (name of interviewee), a board member of (credit union 
name), on (date).  Thank-you for participating in my study.   
 
1.  I will start off the interviews by asking how and why you became involved with 
the Board of Directors at (credit union name)?  For what reasons did you become 
involved with the Board? 
 
2. Could you describe the director recruitment process at (credit union name)? 
 Was the director recruitment process formal, informal, or both? What was your 
experience with the director recruitment process? 
 
3. Did the Board have a specific strategy to recruit women or visible minorities to 
the Board?  If so, what steps did the board take to recruit women and/or visible 
minorities?  Were women and/or visible minorities recruited through informal 
means? For example, were branch managers or current board members instructed 
to keep an eye out for potential candidates, and/or female and/or visible minority 
candidates in particular? 
 
4. Did the Board discuss the issue of diversity discussed? If so, when was this issue 
discussed and what was the impetus for this/these discussions? Why did the 
Board discuss this issue? 
 
5. Did (credit union name) have a formal diversity policy? What are your thoughts 
regarding the use of formal diversity policies? 
 
6. Some people argue that women and visible minorities bring a different 
perspective to the decision making process, while others think diversity can 
result in conflict.  Do you think that women or visible minorities bring a different 
perspective to the decision making process either overtly or subconsciously?  (As 
a female director, do you feel that you bring a different perspective to the board 
in any way?  How do you think that influences you, if at all?) 
 
7. In your view, is diversity beneficial or detrimental to the decision making 
process?   
 
8. Some people have suggested that to achieve diversity, the Board may have to 
provide particular services that may help facilitate the participation of women or 
visible minorities such as, the provision of childcare services, or having different 
meeting times or dates to accommodate a variety of work schedules. Did (credit 
union name) Credit Union implement any sorts of policies or services to 
accommodate gender or cultural differences? 
 
 157
 9. In your view, was the Board open to new ideas and different perspectives? Was 
everybody given a fair chance to influence the decision making process and to 
influence the final outcomes, either at the committee level or the board level? 
 
10.  As you know, I am trying to find out what factors lead to a diverse board and 
what may inhibit more women and visible minorities on the Board. In your view, 
what factors facilitate or inhibit it? 
 
11. Those are all the questions I have.  Is there anything that I didn’t ask you that 
you think I should have, or anything you would like to add or comment on? 
 
Thank-you very much for talking with me.  
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 APPENDIX D 
 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT RELEASE FORM 
 
Co-operative Democracy: Gender and Visible Minority representation on Credit Union 
Boards of Directors. 
 
I, __________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of my personal 
interview in this study, and have been provided with the opportunity to add, alter, and 
delete information from the transcript as appropriate.  I acknowledge that the transcript 
accurately reflects what I said in my personal interview with Kimberly Brown.  I hereby 
authorize the release of this transcript to Kimberly Brown to be used in the manner 
described in the consent form. 
 
If you do not check one of the following, it will be assumed that (a) applies: 
 
________ (a) I prefer to remain anonymous, as described in the consent form.  I 
understand that my remarks will not be attributed to my name.  Instead, they may 
be attributed to an unnamed individual or to a pseudonym or a composite profile. 
 
________ (b) the remarks contained in the authorized transcript may be 
attributed to me by name, or used anonymously, at the author’s discretion. 
 
________ (c) I prefer to have all remarks from the authorized transcript attribute 
to me by name if they are used. 
 
________ (d) certain remarks I have indicated by initials in the margin are to be 
kept anonymous as in (a) above; the rest of my comments (unmarked in the 
margins) may be attributed to me. 
 
I have received a copy of this Interview Transcript Release Form for my own records. 
 
 
________________________   ________________________ 
(Name of Participant)     (Date) 
 
 
________________________   ________________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Signature of Researcher) 
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 APPENDIX E 
 
SMS BOARD CANDIDATES, 1995 - 2001 
 
Year Candidates Elected 
   
Ravinder Bhullar Bruce Chapman* 
Bruce Chapman* Frank Harper 
Frank Harper Dale Mumford* 
Dale Mumford*  
1995 
Alvin Myhre  
   
Sarbjit Bains Lloyd Craig* 
Lloyd Craig* Bert Miles* 
Hari Dhillon Doug Stone* 
John Jansen  
Bert Miles*  
Hari Sharma  
Doug Stone*  
1996 
Dave Vaishnav  
   
Sarjit Bains Rodney Bergen 
Rodney Bergen Amber Goddyn 
Aaron Gill Michael McCartney 
Amber Goddyn  
John Jansen  
Michael McCartney  
Jim Sumi  
1997 
David Vaishnav  
   
1998 Bruce Chapman* Bruce Chapman* 
 Frank Harper* Frank Harper* 
 Tom Kirstein* Tom Kirstein* 
 Maureen Wood  
   
John Jansen John Jansen 
Doug Stone Doug Stone 
Steven Moore Steven Moore 
1999 
(Total of 7 candidates. Names 
unknown)  
   
Amber Goddyn* Amber Goddyn* 
Doug Brawn Doug Brawn 
Gary McCarthy Gary McCarthy 
Jim Rhodes  
2000 
Jim Browne  
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 Year Candidates Elected 
   
2000 
cont... 
Derwyn Owen  
2001 Frank Harper* Frank Harper* 
 Tom Kirstein* Tom Kirstein* 
 Marvin Shaffer Marvin Shaffer 
 (Number of candidates 
unknown. Names unknown)  
   
2002 John Jansen* John Jansen* 
 Doug Stone* Doug Stone* 
 Ken Martin Ken Martin 
 (Number of candidates 
unknown. Names unknown)  
 
      * Denotes incumbent candidates 
 
       Note: Female candidates in bold script 
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 APPENDIX F 
 
CCS BOARD CANDIDATES, 2001 - 2006 
 
Year Candidates Elected 
   
Myrna Borleske (Island) Patricia Lane* 
Chris Craig (Island) Mike Wagnell* 
Peter S. Dawson (Island) Bill Wellburn* 
Jim Hackler (Island) Tilly Marxreiter* 
Wendy Jackson (Island) Ken Johnston* 
Patricia Lane (Island)*  
Verne T. Simpson (Island)  
Margaret Stephen (Island)  
Adrien Viani (Island)  
Mike Wagnell (Island)*  
Bill Wellburn (Island)*  
David Bach (Mainland)  
Ken Johnson (Mainland)*  
Tilly Marxreiter (Mainland)*  
Ragini Rankin (Mainland)  
2001 
David Reay (Mainland)  
   
Chris Craig (Island) Chris Craig 
Janice de Cuhna (Island)* Janice de Cuhna* 
Jim Hackler (Island) Gordon Munn* 
Gordon Munn (Island)* Christine Brodie* 
Graham Ross (Island) Georgiana Evans* 
Christine Brodie (Mainland)* John Huska* 
Georgiana Evans (Mainland)*  
Carlton Hibbert (Mainland)  
John Huska (Mainland)*  
2002 
Donna Morton (Mainland)  
   
Karen Kesteloo* Karen Kesteloo* 
Bob Garnett* Bob Garnett* 
Doug Brawn* Doug Brawn* 
Daniel Burns* Daniel Burns* 
Ken Martin*  
Lynn Hunter  
Elizabeth Rhett Woods*  
Jim Hackler  
2003 
Balwant Sanghera  
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 Year Candidates Elected 
   
Bill Wellburn* Bill Wellburn* 
Gordon Munn* Gordon Munn* 
Frank Harper* Frank Harper* 
Ken Martin* Ken Martin* 
Iain Hooey  
Barry Britton  
Bill Vogel  
Dave Sela  
2004 
Ben Phillips  
   
Christine Brodie* Christine Brodie* 
Mary Jane Stenberg Mary Jane Stenberg 
Doug Stone* Doug Stone* 
John Jansen* Elizabeth Rhett Woods** 
John Page  
Elizabeth Rhett Woods**  
Iain Hooey  
Stan Hartfelder  
Dave Sela  
Hart Pfortmueller  
Ben Phillips  
Ragini Rankin  
2005 
Bill Hall  
   
2006 Daniel Burns* Daniel Burns* 
 Bob Garnett* Bob Garnett* 
 Karen Kesteloo* Karen Kesteloo* 
 Steven Kurrein Steven Kurrein 
 Ben Phillips  
 Geoffrey Tiggs 
  
 
      * Denotes incumbent candidates 
      ** Denotes candidates who previously served on the CCS Board but were not  
           incumbents in the indicated board election.  
 
      Note: Female candidates are in bold script.  Also, because the size of the CCS Board     
               fluctuated, so did the number of vacancies on the Board.  
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 APPENDIX G 
 
SMS DIRECTOR TENURE, 1995 - 2002 
 
Board Member Years Elected Total Years Served 
Tom Kirstein 1988 - 1996 1998 - 2002 14 
Bruce Chapman 1991 - 2000 10 
Bert Miles 1989 - 1998 10 
Doug Stone 1994 - 2002 9 
Lloyd Craig 1992 - 1998 7 
Frank Harper* 1995 - 2002 8 
Dale Mumford 1992 - 1997 6 
Amber Godyn* 1998 - 2001 5 
Adrienne MacLaughlin 1994 - 1997 4 
Rodney Berger* 1997 - 1999 3 
Gurmant Singh Grewal 1994 - 1996 3 
John Jansen* 1999 - 2002 3 
Steven Moore* 1999 - 2001 3 
Doug Brawn* 2000 - 2002 2 
Gary McCarthey* 2000 - 2001 2 
Michael McCartney* 1998 - 1999 2 
Marvin Shaffer* 2001 1 
Ken Martin* 2002 1 
 
          * Denotes non-incumbents that were elected between 1995 and 2002 
 
          Note: Only those who served the full 2002 board term were included among      
                    those who served until 2002. 
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 APPENDIX H 
 
CCS DIRECTOR TENURE, 2001-2006 
 
Board Member Years Elected Total Years Served 
John Huska 1981 - 2004 24 
Karen Kestelloo 1984 - 2006 23 
Bob Garnett 1987 - 2006 20 
Bert Hayes** 1985 - 2001 17 
Gordon Munn 1990 - 2006 17 
Ken Johnston** 1986 - 2001 16 
Tom Kirstein 1988 - 1996 1998 - 2003 15 
Bill Wellburn 1992 - 2006 15 
Christine Brodie 1993 - 2006 14 
Daniel Burns 1994 - 2006 13 
Doug Stone 1994 - 2006 13 
Janice de Cuhna** 1990 - 2001 12 
Georgina Evans 1993 - 2004 12 
Frank Harper 1995 - 2006 12 
Elizabeth Rhett-Woods 1994 - 2002 2005 - 2006 11 
Patricia Lane 1995 - 2003 9 
Tilly Marxreiter 1995 - 2003 9 
Mike Wagnell 1995 - 2001 7 
John Jansen 1999 - 2004 6 
Terry McPhail** 1997 - 2001 5 
Doug Brawn 2000 - 2003 4 
Ken Martin 2002 1 
Chris Craig* 2002 - 2003 2 
Mary-Jane Stenberg* 2005 - 2006 2 
 
          * Denotes non-incumbents that were elected between 2001 and 2006 
 ** Denotes those who were elected in 2002 but stepped down after the 2002  
      merger with SMS 
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